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OVERVIEW
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), the climate of stability on 
international financial markets observed in previous quarters has prevailed for most of the 
period, in tandem with further reductions in financing costs, more sharply so in the euro area. 
This pattern has not, however, been free from certain bouts of tension, such as that in mid-
October, which was linked to fears over economic growth globally and, especially, in the 
euro area. This episode translated into losses across the board in stock market indices and 
rises in risk premia and in volatility. 
In Spain, 10-year government bond yields stood at 2.1% in end-October, which saw the 
spread relative to German government debt narrow to 125 basis points (bp) in this same 
period. The improved conditions on domestic wholesale markets have been accompanied 
by more buoyant GDP, which is translating into an incipient pick-up in employment and 
some strengthening of the economic and financial position of households and non-financial 
corporations.
Against this backdrop, the rate of decline of lending to the resident private sector has stabilised 
over the past year. And the pace of the decline in lending to households and to non-financial 
corporations has eased in recent months. This aggregate trend will continue to be influenced 
by the need to correct high private-sector debt, especially in construction and real estate-
related activities, where the contraction in credit has been greater than in the other sectors. 
For the first time, this FSR shows the structure of lending to corporations, accurately 
separating lending to large corporations from that to SMEs and their different components. 
Information is also offered on Spanish banks’ new credit, although the related year-on-year 
trend cannot yet be shown.
The year-on-year rate of increase in the total volume of NPLs to the resident private sector 
has eased in recent months, having posted month-on-month declines from January 2014 to 
the latest available data for the current year. This moderation in the pace of NPLs is 
particularly discernible for non-financial corporations and for lending to households for 
house purchase. The NPL ratio, despite posting higher levels than those observed last year, 
has dipped slightly from the levels attained towards late 2013 and 2014 Q1. This fall is the 
result of declines in NPLs in the year to date, largely offset by the downward course of 
lending (the denominator of the ratio).
The prevailing climate of stability on financial markets has been evident in the continuing low 
levels of the systemic risk indicators for Spain. Retail funding from the deposits of households 
and non-financial corporations shows a stable trend which, combined with the contraction 
in credit, provides for a narrowing of the retail sector funding gap.
In the first half of 2014 the Spanish banking sector posted a consolidated result of almost 
€8 billion, slightly down on the same period a year earlier. Net interest income declined, 
essentially as a result of the reduction in the volume of activity and of a still-high level of 
assets not generating a return. Gains on financial transactions also fell, thereby shrinking 
gross income. These factors, which exerted downward pressure on results, were offset 
positively by the decline in operating expenses, the outcome of the reduction in the number 
of employees and offices, and by lower asset impairment losses.
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The year 2014 saw the roll-out of the new EU prudential regulations, which transpose the 
solvency standards known as Basel III to the European regulatory framework. Under Basel III, 
Spanish banks as a whole showed a CET1 ratio of 11.6% in June 2014. The respective 
metrics for CET1, total capital and Tier 1 capital all comfortably exceed the regulatory 
minimum levels in Basel III.
In sum, the rate of decline of aggregate bank lending in Spain has shown signs of easing, 
both for households and for non-financial corporations. There has, moreover, been a 
discernible slowdown in the rate of increase in NPLs in these sectors, while their NPL ratios 
show slight declines in the latest data for 2014 compared with those for end-2013 and for 
2014 Q1. Whether these trends continue and intensify will largely depend on how the Spanish 
economy fares. Currently, the economy is in a phase of incipient recovery which, under the 
most likely economic scenario, will take root; however, this scenario is not free from certain 
risks linked to factors both external (the performance of the global economy and, in particular, 
that of the euro area) and internal (linked to the need to see through the correction of certain 
imbalances).
The comprehensive assessment exercise conducted by the ECB, whose results were made 
known on 26 October, allows for evaluation of the quality of public financial information and 
of the impact of an adverse scenario, with a very low probability of occurrence, on the loss-
absorbing capacity of the participating banks. The results show that no Spanish bank would 
today have a capital shortfall taking as a reference the thresholds defined in the exercise. As 
analysed in detail in this Report, the AQR exercise shows that the adjustments required in 
Spain to banks’ capital as at end-year 2013 are the lowest among the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) members. Further, the impact of the adverse scenario on Spain would be 
far less than the average for the banks participating in the exercise. Accordingly, the exercise 
reveals that Spanish banks’ balance sheets offer a rigorous view of asset values and that 
their resilience in the face of adverse scenarios would be relatively high. 
In the “Other matters” section, recent developments in different international fora are 
presented. First, the latest work by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on the use 
of the countercyclical capital buffer is covered. Second, recent initiatives by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) in connection with shadow banking are addressed. And third, the 
main proposals by international organisations regarding international accounting standards 
are set out.
Notably, two boxes are included. The first offers an analysis of the distribution of  resolution 
competences in SSM Member States. Broadly, the possibilities range from placing 
national resolution authorities under the same roof as the national supervisory authority 
to creating independent national authorities, with intermediate arrangements involving 
different distributions of functions between respective independent resolution and 
prudential supervision authorities. As set out in the Box, each of the models has 
advantages and disadvantages, although all the SSM countries, with the exception of 
Finland, are opting to place the resolution authority under the roof of the authority with 
supervisory powers.
Finally, the second Box describes different aspects of the SSM and the organisational 
changes at the ECB and the Banco de España to address the needs arising as from 4 
November this year on the entry into force of the SSM and the assumption of direct 
supervisory responsibilities by the ECB. 
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report, the climate of stability on 
international financial markets observed in previous months has prevailed for most of the 
period, against a background marked by the search for yield by investors, abundant global 
liquidity and growing differences in the monetary policies of the main advanced economies. 
Thus, whereas rises in official interest rates are anticipated in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, Japan and the euro area remain in the midst of a phase of monetary 
expansion. At its meetings in June and September, the ECB Governing Council adopted a 
broad package of monetary easing measures, conventional and non-conventional alike, in 
order to combat the risks associated with a scenario of low inflation over a prolonged 
period.1 Market developments have not, however, been free from the occasional episode 
of tension. One such instance was in early August, in connection mainly with the geopolitical 
conflict in Ukraine. Another was in mid-October, linked to fears over economic growth 
globally and, in particular, in the euro area, which translated into losses across the board 
in stock market indices and rises in risk premia and in volatility.
Against this background, there was a fairly generalised decline over the past six months in 
sovereign debt yields in the euro area to historically low levels (see Charts 1.1.A and B). In 
particular, in the case of Spanish ten-year bonds, yields dipped from 3% at end-April to 2.1% 
in end-October, with the spread relative to the German Bund narrowing from 155 bp to 125 
bp over the same period. Average credit risk premia also fell on fixed-income securities issued 
by European financial and non-financial corporations (see Chart 1.1.C), standing at their 
lowest levels since late 2007. In the United States and the United Kingdom, long-term debt 
yields also fell, albeit less markedly. The performance of stock market indices differed from 
one area to another, with moderate declines in the euro area and rises in the United States 
(see Chart 1.1.D). The dollar, for its part, tended to appreciate against the main currencies.
The pattern described has been accompanied by growing concern over the latest 
developments in certain international financial markets which might have implications for 
future financial conditions. In particular, investors’ greater readiness to assume risks, 
assisted by plentiful global liquidity, has contributed to taking credit spreads on the high-
risk segments, such as high-yield bonds, to historically low levels. In parallel, issues of 
these latter assets have been notably buoyant in some areas, meaning that the weight of 
these instruments in investor portfolios has risen, increasing the impact a potential price 
correction would entail, which might, moreover, be exacerbated by the low liquidity of the 
markets on which some of these assets are traded.
In the first half of 2014, growth in the global economy was lower than expected. This 
pattern was apparent in the advanced and emerging economies alike. Among the former, 
there was a notable contraction in GDP in the United States in Q1 as a result of temporary 
factors (particularly harsh weather and a marked decline in inventories), although the 
economy rebounded appreciably in Q2 and is expected to grow at a rate close to 3% in 
the second half of the year. In Japan, in Q2, the impact on activity of the rise in consumption 
tax was somewhat greater than anticipated. In the euro area, following four quarters of 
The climate of stability on 
international financial markets 
has prevailed for most of the 
period, against a background 
of abundant global liquidity 
and growing differences 
between the monetary policies 
of the main advanced 
economies. But the 
developments described have 
not been free from certain 
episodes of tension, as was 
the case in mid-October
In the euro area, sovereign 
debt yields and risk premia on 
bonds issued by the private 
sector fell. In the United States 
and the United Kingdom, 
long-term interest rates 
declined more moderately. 
The performance of stock 
market indices differed from 
one area to another and the 
dollar appreciated against the 
main currencies
The pattern described has 
been accompanied by growing 
concern over the latest 
developments in certain 
international financial markets 
which might have implications 
for future financial conditions
Global economic activity 
slowed during the first half 
of 2014 owing to negative 
surprises in advanced 
economies…
1  Box 2.3 in this FSR sets out the ECB’s new non-conventional measures. For greater details on the ECB’s 
measures, see the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” section in the July 2014 and October 2014 
editions of the Banco de España’s Economic Bulletin.
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moderate growth, GDP was flat in Q2 compared with Q1 (see Chart 1.2.A). This performance 
was partly influenced by temporary factors but was worse than expected. The UK economy 
was an exception to this tendency and evidenced a balanced pattern of growth, which 
stood at slightly over 3% year-on-year. Inflation in the advanced economies has held at 
low levels (and generally below central bank targets) with the exception of Japan, where it 
stood at over 3% owing to the above-mentioned tax rise.
The emerging markets also weakened somewhat in the first half of 2014. In particular, in 
China, there was a manifest slowdown in activity in Q1, while in Q2 support from economic 
policy reversed the trend. There has also been a particularly sharp reduction in growth in 
Latin America (where investment is markedly weak) and in Russia and its neighbouring 
countries owing to the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine. Inflation in these economies has 
held relatively stable.
The disappointing growth figures in the first half of the year have prompted a significant 
downward revision of growth forecasts for the world economy in 2014 and 2015. However, 
once some of the temporary factors behind this slowdown have abated, the central 
scenario projects a gradual strengthening of the world economy over the coming quarters. 
In the advanced economies the improvement in activity will be underpinned by favourable 
monetary conditions, a lesser fiscal adjustment and the gradual recovery of labour markets. 
… and emerging 
economies alike
After the trough in the first half 
of the year, the outlook for the 
world economy is one of 
gradual recovery, although the 
risks of a less favourable 
performance remain in place
SOURCES: Datastream, Reuters and Bloomberg.
a Euro area: 5-year iTraxx Europe Senior Financials. United States and United Kingdom: average 5-year CDS for commercial banks. 
Latest data: 29 October 2014.
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And the pace of growth will foreseeably be mixed: brisker in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and less dynamic in the euro area and Japan. A modest acceleration in 
activity is also expected in the emerging economies, assisted by the pick-up in demand 
from the advanced economies. But this scenario is subject to some downside risks to 
growth. Chief among these are those linked to a possible exacerbation of the situation in 
the various geopolitical hotspots, to a potential worsening of the situation on financial 
markets and to a possible unfavourable trend in inflation in some advanced economies.
In Spain, GDP posted growth of 0.6% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, 0.2 pp up on Q1, taking 
the year-on-year figure to 1.2%. This more favourable economic performance was reflected 
in increases in employment, which showed a positive year-on-year rate of increase for the 
first time since 2008 (see Chart 1.2.B). In this setting, and on EPA (Spanish Labour Force 
Survey) figures, the unemployment rate stood in June 2014 at 1.6 pp below the figure a 
year earlier, albeit remaining at a still very high level (24.5%). According to the INE flash 
estimate, GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.5% in Q3. Over this same period the 
pace of year-on-year growth in employment rose, according to the EPA, with the 
unemployment rate falling to 23.7%. 
The latest information on non-financial private sector balance sheets and incomes shows 
some improvement in the related economic and financial situation. Thus, non-financial 
corporations’ debts continued to decline moderately, while the sector’s profitability has 
tended to pick up, according to the latest Central Balance Sheet Data Office information. 
The improvement in firms’ economic and financial situation is estimated to be relatively 
generalised, although those departing from a less favourable starting position are expected 
to have benefited to a greater extent.2 In the case of households, the fall in unemployment 
combined with a reduction in debt and a slight rise in net wealth, associated with the 
increase in the value of net financial assets and in real estate wealth, which was in turn 
boosted by the modest rise in house prices in the first half of 2014 (see Box 1.1). In any 
event, the debt ratios of households and firms remain above the euro area average, and 
incomes have not regained pre-crisis levels, meaning these sectors remain subject to a 
high degree of financial pressure.
The dynamism of GDP 
increased in Spain in Q2, as 
was reflected in the first year-
on-year increase in 
employment since 2008…
… and the economic and 
financial situation of 
households and non-financial 
corporations tended to 
improve, although the degree 
of financial pressure remains 
very high…
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates.
b Year-on-year rates.
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2  For more details see Box 1 in the article “Results of non-financial corporations to 2014 Q2”, M. Méndez and Á. 
Menéndez, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, September 2014.
3  The ratio is calculated according to the new European System of Regional and National Accounts (ESA 2010).
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BOX 1.1PRICE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SPANISH REAL ESTATE MARKET
Thus, irrespective of the price measure considered, it can be seen 
that the correction had two main phases (2008-2009 and 2011-
2013), consistent with the double-dip recession in the Spanish 
economy. In 2010 the fall in prices eased somewhat (influenced in 
part by tax reasons) and in 2014 to date prices appear to be 
stabilising, with even a timid rebound (see Panel B).
The correction recorded since 2007 represents a significant 
adjustment. Future price performance will continue to be influenced, 
in any event, by Spain’s economic performance, by financing 
conditions which, despite monetary impulses in the euro area, are 
tighter than in the period previous to 2007 (see Panel C), and by the 
need to absorb the housing overhang. According to Ministry of Public 
Works estimates, at end-2013 the stock of unsold housing amounted 
to more than 560,000 units, having decreased by just 3% in that year 
and by 13% from its peak in 2009. In turn, the demand for housing 
(number of housing market transactions; see Panel D) has recovered 
slightly (driven in part by foreign buyers), although it naturally remains 
considerably below the highs recorded in the boom years. 
Against this backdrop, in recent months differences have been 
observed in price performance by region, with prices in certain 
regions (such as the Balearic and Canary Islands, and some 
provincial capitals) moving on a more expansionary course. 
House prices in Spain peaked in 2007. This was followed by a 
process of adjustment, owing to the need to correct in part the 
previous sharp price increases, and to the significant contraction 
in demand associated with the decline in disposable household 
income, rising unemployment and tighter financing conditions 
against the backdrop of the economic and financial crisis. 
Since 2007, house prices have fallen by 30%-40%, according to 
how they are measured (see Panel A). The differences between the 
measures used are due to the difficulty of calculating a single 
representative value on what is a highly heterogeneous market, 
where prices vary significantly according to the location, type, 
characteristics, age, etc. of the property. Moreover, the different 
indicators are based on different data sources: deed of sale prices 
adjusted for quality of housing in the case of the INE house price 
index (IPV); appraisals in the case of the Ministry of Public Works 
and Tinsa; and asking prices in the case of the Internet portals. 
Accordingly, they may perform differently in terms of their 
sensitivity and responsiveness to market changes in whichever 
direction, which explains why neither the cumulative declines from 
peak values nor the year-on-year rates (see Panel B) coincide 
exactly. Nevertheless, the different indicators do all reflect a 
common general pattern. 
In the case of general government, the latest data (for 2014 Q2) on the debt ratio place it 
at 96.3% of GDP3, 4.2 pp up on the end-2013 figure. Against this backdrop of high debt, 
the low level the cost of debt has reached offers significant relief in containing debt-
associated expenditure. Furthermore, the latest developments in respect of the financing 
of this sector show a progressive slowdown in its liabilities, which grew at a rate of 6.1% 
in August (the latest figure available).
In short, since the publication of the last FSR, financing conditions on domestic financial 
markets have improved. Further, the greater dynamism of Spanish GDP is translating into 
a pick-up in employment. These developments have been accompanied, moreover, by 
some strengthening in the economic and financial situation of the non-financial private 
sector. However, the economic recovery is still incipient and not free from risks, linked 
largely to the international context and to the need to complete the correction of certain 
domestic imbalances.
…while general government 
debt continued to rise, albeit 
at an increasingly moderate 
rate
The economic and financial 
situation in Spain is improving, 
but the outlook is clouded by 
some substantial risks
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BOX 1.1PRICE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SPANISH REAL ESTATE MARKET (cont´d)
SOURCES: Expocasa, Fotocasa, Idealista, INE, Ministerio de Fomento, Tinsa and Banco de España.
a INE house price index.
b? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
c Bank Lending Survey. Percentage of banks reporting a tightening of their new-loan-approval standards less percentage of those reporting an easing in lending 
standards.
d Difference between the average interest rate on new loans to households for house purchase and 12-month EURIBOR.
e Public-deeded housing transactions, from the Ministry of Public Works statistic on real estate transactions.
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2  DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
The consolidated total assets of deposit institutions, which include both their business in 
Spain and that of their subsidiaries and branches abroad, amounted to €3,534 billion in June 
2014. They thus contracted by 5.8% between June 2013 and June 2014 (see Table 2.1), 
continuing the downward trend in the balance sheet reported in previous FSRs.
The decline in assets was caused by the performance of business in Spain, which explains 
why business abroad, measured in terms of the aggregate balance sheet of deposit 
institutions at consolidated level, increased its relative weight from 29.2% in June 2013 to 
31.6% in June 2014.
In assessing the foreseeable impact on financial stability of the increasing relative weight 
of business abroad over the last few years as a result of the sharper falls in, or lower 
growth of, business in Spain, it must be taken into account that the model adopted by 
Spanish deposit institutions in their expansion abroad is based on financially autonomous 
subsidiaries engaging essentially in retail banking in local currency.
Financing to the private sector, which includes credit1 and fixed income, declined by 4.6% 
in the past year (see memorandum item of Table 2.1). This year-on-year decrease came as 
a result of falls both in its main component, credit to the private sector, which decreased 
by 3.7%, and in private-sector fixed income securities (15.8%), and centred on business 
in Spain, the behaviour of which is analysed below in greater detail. All told, the smaller 
year-on-year fall in financing to the private sector (4.6%) with respect to that in total assets 
between June 2013 and June 2014 (5.8%) explains why the weight of financing to the 
private sector increased in the period in relative terms, from 60.6% of the total balance 
sheet in June 2013 to 61.3% in June 2014 (see Chart 2.1.A).
Financing to general government (credit and fixed income) posted a year-on-year increase of 
2.2% at June 2014, mainly due to the rise in fixed income, since credit (smaller amount in 
relative terms) remained practically unchanged in June 2014 relative to June 2013. The increase 
in financing to general government, whose relative weight rate in consolidated balance sheets 
has been rising (see Chart 2.1.A) was due to its growth in business abroad, since in business 
in Spain it remained practically unchanged between June 2013 and June 2014.
Total NPLs at consolidated balance sheet level and the NPL ratio at consolidated level 
showed a certain change in trend from June 2013 to June this year. Thus, between June 
2013 and June 2014 NPLs grew by 4.7% and the NPL ratio rose by 70 bp to 7.3%.2 
However, comparison of the values for June 2014 (the most recent figures at consolidated 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1  CONSOLIDATED BALANCE 
SHEET OF DEPOSIT 
INSTITUTIONS
The consolidated total 
assets of deposit institutions 
contracted by 5.8% between 
June 2013 and June 2014
Although financing to the 
private sector in year-on-year 
terms as at June 2014 
decreased, its relative weight 
in the balance sheet rose...
...as did financing to general 
government, the year-on-year 
rate of change of which 
increased
Total NPLs at consolidated 
balance sheet level and the 
associated NPL ratio 
increased in year-on-year...
1  From January 2014 establecimientos financieros de crédito (previously “specialised credit institutions”, now 
“credit financial intermediaries”) are no longer classified as credit institutions, so the loans and deposits arising 
from them ceased to be sectorised under the related CI headings. To enable the various balance sheet items 
involved to be compared over time, the data taken from the individual financial statements are appropriately 
adjusted to neutralise the change. However, at consolidated level, no such adjustment has been made, since a 
number of credit financial intermediaries are subsidiaries of deposit institutions. These effects have a scant 
impact on the consolidated balance sheet, but they have to be taken into account in year-on-year comparisons.
2  In addition to credit to and NPLs of the resident private sector, this figure includes those relating to general 
government and credit institutions. This, in addition to the scope of consolidation, means that the ratio given here 
differs from that analysed in greater detail in Section 2.1.2 of this Report, which refers to credit to the resident 
private sector in Spain.
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level) with those for December 2013 (the last FSR) reveals a decrease of 4.2% in total 
NPLs and of 0.5 pp in the total NPL ratio (from 7.8% in December 2013 to 7.3% at 
present).
The behaviour of total NPLs and of the NPL ratio is mainly attributable to business in 
Spain, where, as analysed in greater depth in Section 2.1.2 on credit to the resident private 
...terms, but have fallen from 
December 2013
Jun-14
Change
Jun-14/
Jun-13
Relative
Weight
Jun-13
Relative
Weight
Jun-14
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 123,755 -4.5 3.5 3.5
Loans and advances to credit institutions 180,212 -24.8 6.4 5.1
General government 108,632 0.8 2.9 3.1
Other private sectors 2,024,355 -3.7 56.1 57.3
Debt securities 612,815 -4.8 17.2 17.3
Other equity instruments 44,458 24.0 1.0 1.3
Investments 46,874 -12.7 1.4 1.3
Derivatives 168,437 -21.1 5.7 4.8
Tangible assets 52,807 10.1 1.3 1.5
Other (b) 171,279 -2.5 4.7 4.8
TOTAL ASSETS 3,533,624 -5.8 100 100
Memorandum items
    Financing to private sector 2,167,780 -4.6 60.6 61.3
    Financing to general government 518,643 2.2 13.5 14.7
    Total NPLs 213,548 4.7 5.4 6.0
    Total NPL ratio 7.3 70 (d)
    Loan loss and country risk provisions (a) -123,602 -2.6 -3.4 -3.5
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 186,979 -31.4 7.3 5.3
Deposits from credit institutions 382,952 -13.7 11.8 10.8
General government 105,881 -4.7 3.0 3.0
Other private sectors 1,765,820 0.5 46.9 50.0
Marketable debt securities 399,299 -10.7 11.9 11.3
Derivatives 162,845 -16.5 5.2 4.6
Subordinated debt 46,210 9.4 1.1 1.3
Provisions for pensions and tax 34,929 -7.1 1.0 1.0
Other (b) 199,279 -6.0 5.7 5.6
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,284,193 -6.7 93.8 92.9
Memorandum items
    Eurosystem net lending (c) 154,798 -35.8 6.4 4.4
Minority interests 30,346 17.1 0.7 0.9
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -10,633 . -0.4 -0.3
Own funds 229,719 3.9 5.9 6.5
TOTAL EQUITY 249,431 8.1 6.2 7.1
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,533,624 -5.8 100 100
Assets
Liabilities and equity
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET. 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS 
TABLE 2.1 
Jun-14
Change
Jun-14/
Jun-13
Relative
Weight
Jun-13
Relative
Weight
Jun-14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a? ????????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
b The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
c Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. September 2014 data (latest available) and 
September 2013 data to maintain the year-on-year comparison.
d Difference calculated in bp.
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sector, the NPL growth rate has slowed in recent months. Meanwhile, in business abroad, 
NPLs were already posting year-on-year falls at June 2014 (2.5%), and slight declines 
were apparent in the NPL ratio (from 3% at June 2013 to 2.9% at June 2014), which was 
running at appreciably lower levels than the total NPL ratio of business in Spain.
Loan loss and country risk provisions decreased by 2.6% between June 2013 and June 
2014 (see memorandum item of Table 2.1). The reasons for this behaviour, which was 
uneven across banks, were various, at a time when some of them are managing to 
reduce their NPLs in absolute terms and others are cutting back their rate of increase. 
Taking into account these developments, there are three main reasons for the year-on-
year decrease in loan loss provisions. First, charge-offs; second, additions to retail 
mortgage NPLs as a result of review of the related forborne exposures, where, because 
of their nature (normally collateralised), the legally stipulated provisions are lower than in 
other lending; and, finally, reclassifications to NPLs from the property development 
portfolio to which the general provisions recorded under Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 
18/2012 were reassigned.
Derivatives on the assets side showed a decrease of 21.1% year-on-year at June 2014, 
similar to that on the liabilities side (16.5% in June 2014 with respect to the same month a 
year earlier), so the net position in derivatives (assets less liabilities) remained at very low 
levels in terms of the balance sheet total. In any event, as noted in previous FSRs, the 
downward trend of derivatives is largely explained by the more extensive use of position 
netting agreements.
A notable development in consolidated total liabilities (see Table 2.1) was the decrease in 
balances from central banks, down 31.4% year-on-year at June 2014. This item has been 
decreasing in recent periods as a result of the correction of the sharp upturn seen in 2012 
due to banks’ operations with the Eurosystem, which provided long-term liquidity to allay 
euro area financial market tensions and malfunctions, particularly in the money markets. 
These operations with the Eurosystem reached their peak in August 2012, and since then 
have declined considerably in amount. The latest available figure, for September 2014, 
Balances from central banks 
decreased, reflecting the 
decline in liquidity taken by 
banks from the Eurosystem...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 
Deposit institutions 
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puts the net recourse to the Eurosystem by Spanish banks (difference between funds 
received and deposited) at 4.4% of their consolidated balance sheet total, as compared 
with 6.4% at September 2013 (see liabilities memorandum item of Table 2.1). 
Deposits from credit institutions fell by 13.7% between June 2013 and June 2014, and, as 
a result, their relative weight was down by 1 pp to 10.8%. Their year-on-year fall was less 
than that of assets (24.8%), where credit to deposit institutions lost relative weight in total 
assets, falling by more than 1 pp from 6.4% to 5.1%.
Private sector deposits grew by 0.5% year-on-year at June 2014 (see Table 2.1), with similar 
growth rates in business in Spain and in business abroad. Although the increase in deposits 
was moderate, notably they were, along with subordinated debt, the only liability item of 
deposit institutions to show a positive year-on-year rate of change at June 2014. This change 
gave rise to an increase in their relative weight in the total balance sheet from 46.9% at June 
2013 to 50% at June 2014 (see Chart 2.1.B). This boosted the relative weight of private 
sector deposits compared with other sources of funding for deposit institutions.
In this respect, although financial market conditions have become more favourable in 
recent months, prompting securities issuance by some Spanish deposit institutions, 
marketable debt securities as a whole continued their downward path, falling by 10.7% at 
June 2014, so their relative weight in the balance sheet dropped from 11.9% to 11.3% (see 
Table 2.1). Subordinated debt showed an increase of 9.4% at June 2014 relative to the 
same month a year earlier, so its relative weight in the balance sheet rose from 1.1% at 
June 2013 to 1.3% at June this year. This development in subordinated debt came as a 
result of the issues launched by some larger institutions in the period under analysis.
The total equity of deposit institutions increased by 8.1% year-on-year at June 2014. This 
increase gave rise to a strengthening of equity in the balance sheet structure of banks, 
since its relative weight rose by nearly 1 pp from 6.2% at June 2013 to 7.1% at June 2014. 
The own funds of banks grew by 3.9% to stand at 6.5% of consolidated total assets in 
June 2014 (see Table 2.1).
Credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain, as per individual financial 
statement data, showed at June 2014 a year-on-year rate of change of –8%,3 similar to 
that in August 2014 (–8.2%), the latest figure available (see Chart 2.2.A).
The data to June 2014, which are the latest available figures allowing a year-on-year 
comparison of credit by sector, show a moderation in the rate of decline for both households 
(fall of 4.5% at June 2014 against a decrease of 5.5% at December 2013) and non-financial 
corporations (fall of 9.6% at June 2014 against a drop of 11.1% at December 2013, after 
adjustment of this latter rate for the transfer of assets to Sareb4).
In credit to households, the year-on-year rate of contraction moderated in both that for 
house purchase (fall of 4.2% at June 2014, against a fall of 4.6% at December 2013) and 
...as did deposits from credit 
institutions...
...while deposits from the 
private sector grew slightly, 
gaining relative weight within 
bank balance sheets.
Marketable debt securities 
decreased in volume between 
June 2013 and June 2014
The equity of banks increased, 
as did the weight of own funds 
in the balance sheet
2.1.2  CREDIT TO AND NPLS OF 
THE RESIDENT PRIVATE 
SECTOR IN BUSINESS IN 
SPAIN (ID)
In the first half of the year, 
credit to the resident private 
sector showed signs of a 
moderation in its rate of 
decline, both for households 
and for non-financial 
corporations
3  From January 2014 establecimientos financieros de crédito (previously “specialised credit institutions”, now 
“credit financial intermediaries”) are no longer classified as credit institutions. This reclassification means that 
credit granted to these entities is now considered to be credit to the resident private sector. To enable these time 
series to be compared over time, the pertinent adjustments have been made to neutralise the change. 
4  The transfers to Sareb in February 2013 mean that the year-on-year rate of change at December 2013 would be 
lower if the related adjustment were not made. This is especially so for credit to real estate and construction 
companies, although it also affects total credit and that to non-financial corporations as a whole.
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that for other purposes (decrease of 6.3% year-on-year at June 2014 against a decline of 
10.3% at December 2013, see Chart 2.2.B).
For non-financial corporations, the moderation in the rate of decline in credit was 
concentrated in firms other than those in real estate and construction. Thus, for these 
other business activities, the fall in credit was 4.5% at June 2014 against 8.9% at December 
2013 (see Chart 2.2.B).
In non-financial corporations other than those in real estate and construction, the 
moderation in the fall in credit was seen to be rather widespread when analysed by 
company size. Until recently, information on firm size was not available directly from the 
regulatory returns sent by banks to the Banco de España, so different approximations 
were used. However, since March 2014 loan information distinguishing companies by 
size has been available from the data directly reported by banks, although year-on-year 
comparisons are not yet available (see Box 2.1). In any event, Chart 2.3.A approximates 
the size of borrowers, with the usual limitations, on the basis of the volume of the 
borrower’s bank debt reported to the Central Credit Register (CCR), as has been done in 
the FSR so far. It can be seen that in recent months the rate of decline of credit has 
moderated across all size classes, except for borrowers with a volume of bank debt 
In non-financial corporations 
other than those in real estate 
and construction, the pace of 
contraction of credit slowed, 
and this moderation was 
widespread across the 
spectrum of firm sizes as 
approximated by volume 
of bank debt per the CCR
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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between €10 million and €25 million (see Chart 2.3.A). The behaviour of credit to smaller 
firms may be partly due, as analysed in Chapter 3 of the previous FSR, to the impact of 
regulatory changes in credit to SMEs, consisting of a broader definition of SMEs in line 
with EU practice, and in regulatory capital requirements (which Capital Requirements 
Directive 2013/36/EU eases for SMEs).
From March 2014 banks have to send to the Banco de España, through a regulatory 
return, the new credit granted by them, so this information is now available for the first time 
without having to resort to approximations. Owing to the recentness of this information, for 
the time being long time series allowing year-on-year comparison of changes in new credit 
are not available. To this limitation must be added the due caution associated with the first 
disclosures of a new regulatory return. In any event, Chart 2.3.B shows the monthly 
changes in new credit to the total private sector (resident and non-resident), which amounts 
to approximately €150 billion between March and July 2014 (Box 2.1 gives more details of 
the composition, by type of non-financial corporation, of new credit).
For the first time information 
was available on new credit 
granted in the system, which 
amounted to approximately 
€150 billion between March 
and July 2014
SOURCES: Central Credit Register (CCR) and Banco de España.
a Firm size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
b ?????????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????? ?? ???? ?????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????
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Since March 2014, deposit-taking institutions have been obliged 
to submit a new regulatory return which extends and enhances the 
previously-existing one on the classification of lending to the 
private sector by type of borrower based on economic activity. 
The two main changes to this return are as follows:
— For the first time, it is possible to ascertain, from an official 
return, rather than by means of approximations, the volume of 
credit granted to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
—  Also for the first time, it is possible to find out the volume of new 
lending1 in the system and how it divides up between different 
borrowers (institutional sectors and industries).
The new return offers additional information on, inter alia, forborne 
loans (see Box 2.2), lending to non-residents and the type of 
borrower. Using June 2014 data, this box provides, for the first 
time, information in relation to these two main changes.
Lending to SMEs
In June 2014, non-financial corporations received 42.3% of the 
financing extended to the resident private sector. Households, for 
their part, received 50.8% (see Chart A).
BOX 2.1LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN BUSINESS IN SPAIN
42.9% 
27.4% 
29.7 % 
 MEDIUM 
 SMALL 
 MICROENTERPRISES 
C.  FINANCING TO SMEs. June 2014    
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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21.0% 
3.2% 
6.9% 
50.8% 
 LARGE FIRMS 
 SMEs 
 SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS 
 FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
 HOUSEHOLDS 
B.  FINANCING TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR.  
     June 2014  
0  
5  
10  
15  
20  
25  
30  
35  
Large SMEs Medium Small Microenterprises 
E.  NPL RATIO 
      June 2014 
% 
0  
5  
10  
15  
20  
25  
30  
35  
Large SMEs Medium Small Microenterprises 
F.  NPL RATIO EXCLUDING CONSTRUCTION  
      AND REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 
      June 2014 
% 
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1.9%  
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D.  LOANS GRANTED TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE PERIOD 
MARCH-JUNE 2014
  
1  This consists of new loans granted by banks, other than the rollover or 
refinancing transactions referred to by section 1 (g) of Annex IX of Circular 
4/2004, or subrogations of debtors arising from previous periods.
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BOX 2.1DETAILS OF LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN BUSINESS IN SPAIN (cont´d)
case of large enterprises it falls from 18.2% to 10.6%, while for 
SMEs as a whole it falls from 28% to 13.5%.
New credit
On data for the period March-June 2014, out of the total amount 
drawn down of the new credit granted in the system to finance the 
resident private sector, 89% corresponds to the financing of non-
financial corporations, and the other 11% to households (see Chart D).
Breaking down the above figure for new financing received by non-
financial corporations, 54.7% of the total volume of new credit 
transactions corresponded to large enterprises, 32.5% to SMEs 
and 1.9% to sole proprietorships. Within SMEs, of the total new 
credit granted, 8.8% corresponded to medium-sized enterprises, 
10.2% to small enterprises and 13.4% to microenterprises.
Breaking down the financing received by non-financial corporations, 
the volume of credit received by SMEs from Spanish deposit-
taking institutions amounted to around €290 billion (21% of the 
total lending to the resident private sector, see Chart B), while the 
volume extended to large firms was more than €236 billion (18%, 
see Chart B). Within SMEs (see Chart C), 42.9% of the credit 
granted corresponds to medium-sized enterprises, 27.4% to small 
enterprises and the remaining 29.7% to microenterprises, as 
defined by the European Commission.2 
In terms of credit quality, the overall NPL ratio of non-financial 
corporations stood at 22.5% in June 2014, with differences 
according to the size of the enterprise considered. Thus, the ratio 
for large enterprises was 18.2% and for SMEs 28%. Within the 
latter group, while medium-sized enterprises had a ratio of 
25.7%, that of small enterprises was 27.5%. Finally, the smallest 
SMEs, i.e. microenterprises, had the highest NPL ratio, 31.7% 
(see Chart E). These data indicate that size is positively related to 
credit quality.
If those enterprises that engage in real estate activities and 
construction are excluded from the set of non-financial corporations, 
the conclusions regarding the relative order of their NPL ratio by firm 
size do not change. However, within each size bracket, the NPL ratio 
of non-financial corporations excluding real estate and construction 
firms is significantly lower (see Chart F). Thus, for example, in the 
CCR data can be used to calculate the acceptance rates of loan applications made by 
non-financial corporations to deposit institutions with which they are not working or with 
which they have not had a credit relationship in the preceding few months.5 The acceptance 
rates in these last few months continue to show, albeit with certain volatility, the upward 
trend of previous quarters, running at levels around 35% (see Chart 2.3.C).
In short, the latest available data show that the aggregate amount of credit continued to 
contract, although its rate of decline has steadied. This aggregate behaviour continues to 
be influenced by the need to correct the high indebtedness of the private sector, although 
differing rates of decline are discernible, being slowest in bank financing to firms other 
than those in real estate and construction.
Forborne (restructured and refinanced) loans continue to form a significant part of the 
credit portfolio of deposit institutions, although the data relating to June 2014 indicate that, 
with respect to December 2013, their amount remained practically unchanged (–0.2%), as 
noted in Box 2.2, which analyses transactions of this type for the various sectors of activity.
NPLs to the resident private sector in business in Spain (data per banks’ individual financial 
statements) showed growth of 5.5% at June 2014 with respect to June of the previous 
year. The most recent figure, that for August 2014, reflected a smaller year-on-year change, 
The rate of acceptance 
of loan applications made 
by non-financial corporations 
in recent months continues 
to follow the upward trend of 
previous quarters
In short, the contraction of 
credit is steadying, and the 
rate of decline is moderating 
for firms other than those in 
real estate and construction
NPLs to the resident private 
sector increased at a more 
moderate rate
5  For the subset of firms referred to, the rate of acceptance is defined as the loans accepted by deposit institutions 
divided by the total applications received in a given month. This analysis should be interpreted with due caution, 
first because of the small sample of firms, and second because changes in the rates of acceptance may have 
various causes ranging from alterations in demand to variations in conditions offered by banks.
2  An enterprise is an SME if it complies with the definition in Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 (OJ L 124 of 20 May 
2003). An SME is considered to be an enterprise employing fewer than 
250 persons and which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 
million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million. 
Within the SME category, a small enterprise is defined as one that 
employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or 
annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million and a 
microenterprise as an enterprise employing fewer than 10 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not 
exceed €2 million.
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of 2.1%, continuing the trend towards progressive moderation of the year-on-year rate of 
increase of NPLs (see Chart 2.4.A), with continual month-on-month falls from January this 
year to the latest date for which data are available.
The data relating to June 2014 (the latest available figures allowing year-on-year 
comparison) show that resident private sector NPLs differ across institutional sectors and 
industries (see Chart 2.4.B).
For non-financial corporations, the rate of change of NPLs of 3.9% at June 2014 was the 
result of a slight decrease in those arising from construction and real estate firms (0.5%) and 
a year-on-year increase of 11.2% at June 2014 for other non-financial corporations. The 
growth rate of NPLs of the latter firms moderated significantly (it was 43.6% at June 2013). 
This improved performance was widespread across the various industries, and slight year-
on-year falls in the volume of NPLs at June 2014 were posted by some corporate sectors, 
such as agriculture and fishing (1.7%) and accommodation and food service activities (0.2%).
Significant differences persist 
across sectors/industries
For firms other than those 
engaging in construction 
and real estate development, 
the rate of increase of NPLs 
moderated significantly...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Between December 2012 and January 2014, including both dates, annual rates of change were affected by transfers to Sareb by Group 1 institutions (in December 
2012) and by Group 2 institutions (in February 2013).
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Based on individual financial statements, the total amount of 
forborne (refinanced and restructured) loans, as defined in section 
1(g) of Annex IX to Banco de España Circular 4/2004, stood at 
€210,720 million in June 2014 (down 0.2% from December 2013). 
Almost half of this amount (49.5%) is classified as NPLs, 31.9% as 
performing and the remaining 18.7% as substandard (see Chart A).
Focusing on the resident private sector (i.e. excluding forborne 
loans to general government, which account for 1.7% of total 
forborne transactions), the sectoral breakdown of forborne loans1 
(see Chart B) shows that almost two-thirds of them are to 
companies (65.2%) and slightly more than one-third are to 
households (34.8%).
BOX 2.2FORBORNE (REFINANCED AND RESTRUCTURED) EXPOSURES
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1  Data taken from the new regulatory return, which provides greater detail 
by borrower (see Box 2.1). Slight differences may arise with respect to 
the data used in previous Financial Stability Reports, but they would be 
minor and not affect the conclusions drawn.
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In the household sector, significant differences are apparent 
between housing and other loans. Forborne loans for house 
purchase account for 8% of the total, while the share for other 
loans is 15%.
By firm size (see Chart D), forborne loans to SMEs (as defined in 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003) 
account for 24% (60% of which are NPLs). For large corporations, 
19% of their total loans have been forborne (55% of which are 
NPLs). The share of forborne loans is quite similar among the 
different types of SME, with only microenterprises accounting for 
a slightly higher percentage (26%).
Finally, by sector of activity, 28% of forborne loans are to firms 
engaged in construction and real estate activities in the case of 
large corporations, whereas the share is 44% for SMEs, reaching 
47% for microenterprises (see Chart E).
Chart C shows the weight of forborne loans in total lending, and 
their breakdown into performing, substandard or NPLs.
The weight of forborne loans in total lending to the resident private 
sector is close to 15%. However, the breakdown into corporations 
and households discloses significant differences. For non-financial 
corporations forborne transactions account for 22% of total 
lending, whereas for households the relative share is just 9.6%. 
Additionally, the classification of forborne lending based on credit 
quality also differs substantially between sectors: 58% of forborne 
loans to non-financial corporations are classified as NPLs as 
compared with 36% of those to households.
Within non-financial corporations, forborne loans to construction 
and real estate firms account for 43% of total lending to this 
industry (72% of which are classified as NPLs). For other 
corporations, the weight of forborne loans in total lending is 17%.
BOX 2.2FORBORNE (REFINANCED AND RESTRUCTURED) EXPOSURES (cont´d)
Meanwhile, household NPLs grew by 10.7% year-on-year at June 2014, also slowing with 
respect to previous periods (43.4% at June 2013). The breakdown for households into 
house purchase loans and other loans shows the same trend, although to a different 
extent. While the former increased by 11.9% (compared with growth of 55.5% at June 
2013), the latter were up by 7.5% at June 2014, against 18.7% for the same month a year 
earlier (see Chart 2.4.B).
In June 2014 the NPL ratio of the resident private sector in Spain was 13.4%,6 up 171 bp 
on June 2013. This year-on-year change resulted from growth in the amount of NPLs 
and from a decrease in the volume of outstanding credit (denominator of the ratio). 
However, the downward trend of NPLs from December 2013 explains why the ratio went 
from 13.8% at that date to 13.6% in August 2014, the latest monthly figure available (see 
Chart 2.4.C).
This slight decrease in the NPL ratio was observed widely across the various sectors of 
activity (see Chart 2.4.D). Thus, in household credit, the NPL ratio was 6.7% in June 2014, 
slightly lower than in March that same year (6.9%). In household credit for house purchase, 
the NPL ratio went from 6.1% in March 2014 to 5.8% in June this year, while in household 
credit for purposes other than house purchase the slight moderation of the NPL ratio took 
place from December 2013, slowing from 12.3% to 11.4% in June 2014.
The NPL ratio of non-financial corporations as a whole, at 22.5% in June 2014, was also 
slightly down on end-2013, when it reached 23.3%. There were notable differences among 
non-financial corporations in the NPL ratio for credit to the real estate and construction 
sector (37% in June 2014) and to other non-financial corporations (14.3% in June 2014). 
However, the NPL ratio has behaved similarly in the two sectors in 2014 to date, with the 
ratios in June 2014 being lower than in December 2013 (see Chart 2.4.D).
...as it did, albeit to differing 
extents depending on the loan 
purpose, for households
The NPL ratio of the resident 
private sector decreased 
slightly from December 2013 
until the date of the latest 
available data,...
...a downward trend apparent 
in the various sectors of 
activity
6  As noted above, from January 2014 establecimientos financieros de crédito (credit financial intermediaries) are 
deemed to form part of the resident private sector, so the NPL ratio time series has been adjusted to enable 
inter-period comparison free from this effect.
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In short, the total volume of NPLs of the resident private sector has shown a relatively 
widespread moderation in its year-on-year rate of increase, posting month-on-month falls 
from January 2014 to the date of the latest available figures in August this year. The NPL 
ratio stopped growing and decreased slightly from end-2013 to August 2014, reflecting 
the cumulative fall in NPLs in that period, which, however, was largely dampened by the 
downward trend of aggregate credit (denominator of the ratio). As the recovery of the 
Spanish economy moves onto a firmer footing, the improvement in NPLs throughout 2014 
may also become more strongly entrenched, along with the downward trend in the NPL 
ratio, which is, however, a variable that lags the economic cycle.
Turning to foreclosed assets (those which become part of bank balance sheets as a result 
of debt enforcement proceedings or of a debt settlement agreement between borrower and 
lender), their volume at consolidated level grew by 8.4% with respect to June 2013, while 
remaining practically unchanged between December 2013 and June 2014 (up by 0.6%).
As noted in Chapter 1 of this FSR, since the last FSR a climate of stability has prevailed in 
the financial markets, and this was reflected in the ongoing low levels of the systemic risk 
indicator in Spain following the highs reached around summer 2012 (see Chart 2.5). In the 
past year, systemic risk in Spain has steadied at low levels near to those recorded before 
the financial crisis. This steadiness is apparent in all the markets covered by the systemic 
risk indicator: government debt, money, securities and bank funding markets. For all of 
them, despite isolated upturns, steady low levels have predominated in the past year. The 
favourable performance of these markets in the past year is generally attributable to their 
low volatility, together with growing confidence and an improvement in investors’ 
perception of Spain’s economic and financial situation.
Securities issuance by Spanish deposit institutions has held at low levels in recent months, 
although various institutions have issued subordinated debt, the volume in the second and 
third quarters being lower than in the first quarter of 2014 (see Chart 2.6.A). As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the adjustment of the mix of Spanish institutions’ liabilities to 
reduce their dependence on wholesale funding and thus increase the relative weight of 
retail funds in the funding structure goes some way towards explaining the low issuance 
activity of Spanish institutions, despite the improved conditions in financial markets. To 
these reasons must be added the ongoing downward trend in lending.
In conclusion, the rate of 
increase of NPLs has shown 
a relatively widespread 
moderation, with month-on-
month falls from January 2014 
which are reflected in a very 
slight decrease in the NPL 
ratio in the year so far
2.1.3  FUNDING OF THE 
BANKING SECTOR
SOURCES: Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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The activity of euro area interbank markets has remained weak, holding at levels below 
those of previous years and without any significant changes since the last FSR. Chart 2.6.B 
shows EONIA trading volumes. After bottoming out at the end of 2012, these have followed 
an upward path in 2013 and 2014, albeit relatively moderately and discontinuously. The 
Spanish interbank market behaved similarly.
Owing to the scant activity on the interbank markets, and the unlimited provision of liquidity 
by the Eurosystem, European credit institutions have continued to resort extensively to 
Eurosystem funds, although this has been compatible with an ongoing trend to reduce that 
recourse, which began in summer 2012. Since then, the ability of European banks to raise 
funds on the primary markets has improved considerably, allowing them to lower their 
purchases in regular operations and repay early a portion of the funds received in the two 
3-year tenders (LTROs) allotted in late 2011 and early 2012. As a result, the liquidity provided 
by the Eurosystem has returned to levels similar to those prior to the LTROs, even taking 
into account the effect of the new targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) 
which began to be carried out in September (see Box 2.3 for more details of the ECB’s non-
standard measures). Thus, between the end-October 2013 and end-October 2014, banks 
resident in Spain reduced their gross recourse to the Eurosystem by €76 billion (32%), while 
the outstanding balance in the total Eurosystem decreased by €221 billion or 30% (see 
Chart 2.6.C, which shows the outstanding balance of ECB tenders).
Activity on the interbank 
markets of the euro area 
has remained weak, without 
significant changes since 
the last FSR
The trend towards reducing 
recourse to the Eurosystem 
continued
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Latest data: 29 October 2014. 
b Senior debt and covered bond issues are included. Retained issues are not included.
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if they fulfil certain conditions, and may participate in these 
operations through a group member. In this case, the benchmark 
and the borrowing limits for the group will be calculated on the 
basis of the aggregate lending data for the “TLTRO group”.
As regards eligible collateral, in the TLTROs the same collateral 
rules apply – in relation to eligibility criteria, valuation, haircuts and 
use of collateral – as in other Eurosystem liquidity-providing 
refinancing operations.
Credit institutions participating in the TLTROs are subject to 
specific reporting obligations until the end of the programme in 
September 2018, and to an annual examination of data accuracy.
Also, at its first meeting in September 2014, the Governing Council 
of the ECB decided to launch two asset purchase programmes. 
First, taking into account the role of the securitisation market in 
facilitating new credit flows to the economy, it announced a simple 
asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) with 
underlying assets consisting of claims against the euro area non-
financial private sector. Second, and in parallel, the Governing 
Council of the ECB also announced the third programme for 
purchases of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by euro 
area credit institutions (CBPP3).
The main details of the two programmes were announced in early 
October. In both cases, the securities eligible for purchase will be 
selected from among the assets eligible as collateral for monetary 
policy operations, although there will be some adjustments to take 
into account the difference between accepting assets as collateral 
and buying assets outright, and to ensure that the programmes 
can include all the euro area countries. The two programmes will 
last for at least two years and asset purchases will commence in 
the fourth quarter of 2014, starting with covered bonds in the 
second half of October.3
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
recently adopted several measures to enhance the functioning of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting bank 
lending to the real economy.
In June 2014, it announced a series of targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs).1 The two initial operations were 
scheduled for September (this one has already been carried out) 
and December 2014, and the additional TLTROs will be conducted 
in March, June, September and December 2015, and in March and 
June 2016. All TLTROs will mature in September 2018. The interest 
rate on the TLTROs, which will remain fixed over the life of each 
operation, will be the rate on the main refinancing operations 
prevailing at the time of take-up, plus a fixed spread of 10 bp. 
Starting 24 months after each TLTRO, counterparties will have the 
option to repay any part of the amounts that were allotted in that 
TLTRO at a six-monthly frequency.
In the first two TLTROs as a whole, individual credit institutions will 
be able to borrow an amount equal to up to 7% of the amount of 
their loans to the euro area non-financial private sector (non-
financial corporations and households), excluding loans to 
households for house purchase, outstanding on 30 April 2014.
Thereafter, credit institutions will be able to borrow additional 
amounts in the subsequent TLTROs, depending on whether their 
eligible loans exceed a specified benchmark for each bank. 
Specifically, the additional amount to be borrowed is limited to 
three times the difference between net lending2 since 30 April 
2014 and the benchmark on the date on which this amount is 
requested. The benchmark will always be zero for credit institutions 
reporting positive eligible net lending in the 12 months to 30 April 
2014. For credit institutions reporting negative eligible net lending 
in the 12 months to 30 April 2014, different benchmarks will be 
applied, which will be calculated as follows: (i) for the 12 months 
to 30 April 2015, the average monthly net lending of each credit 
institution in the 12 months to 30 April 2014 will be extrapolated, 
and ii) for the 12 months from 30 April 2015 to 30 April 2016, the 
benchmark monthly net lending will be zero. Institutions that have 
borrowed under the TLTROs but do not reach their specified 
benchmark as of 30 April 2016 will be required to pay back all their 
borrowings in September 2016.
Credit institutions may participate in the TLTROs on an individual 
basis. In addition, several institutions may form a “TLTRO group”, 
BOX 2.3NEW NON-STANDARD MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
1  Subsequently, in July, the technical details of these TLTROs were 
announced and the legal act which is the foundation for the series of 
TLTROs was published (Decision ECB/2014/34 of the European Central 
Bank of 29 July 2014 on measures relating to targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations).
2  Net lending between two specific dates is measured as the difference 
between the amounts of eligible loans outstanding on those dates.
3  For further operational details on these asset purchase programmes, see 
the annexes to the ECB press release of 2 October 2014 on this matter.
As a result of this decrease in gross recourse to the Eurosystem by both banks resident in 
Spain and total Eurosystem banks, the share of loans to Spanish banks in the total 
Eurosystem remained practically unchanged over that period, standing at an average of 
31.3% in September 2014, while the share in September 2013 was 31.4%.
Retail funding raised by Spanish deposit institutions from deposits placed by households 
and non-financial corporations grew by 0.8% year-on-year at August 2014 (latest 
available data), a smaller rate of change than that at the same month a year earlier, when 
Retail funding raised by 
Spanish deposit institutions 
from deposits by households...
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the year-on-year growth was 7.7% (see Chart 2.7.A), but more in line with that prevailing 
before the negative rates of change first appeared in early 2012.
The securities issued by deposit institutions to households and non-financial corporations, 
which also form part of retail funds raised by banks along with household and non-financial 
corporation deposits, continued the decline initiated by them in June 2012, when they 
reached a high due to the regulatory changes relating to contributions to the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund based on the risks assumed (fixed income securities were not subject to 
such contributions). Interest in these products has gradually faded owing to subsequent 
regulatory changes in this respect in August 2012.
Joint analysis of the deposits and fixed income securities issued by deposit institutions to 
households and non-financial corporations shows that retail funding has held steady, 
decreasing at August 2014 by 0.2% in year-on-year terms, compared with a rise of 2% at 
the same month a year earlier. This slight decrease is, however, smaller than at the 
beginning of the year, when the rate of change was more negative.
...and non-financial 
corporations grew moderately 
at August in year-on-year 
terms,...
DEPOSITS FROM HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, ID CHART 2.7
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
Dec-09 Jul-10 Feb-11 Sep-11 Apr-12 Nov-12 Jun-13 Jan-14 Aug-14 
 DEPOSITS PLUS FIXED-INCOME SECURITIES OF DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS HELD BY 
HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
 DEPOSITS  
% 
A.  YEAR-ON-YEAR RATES OF CHANGE 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
Aug-07 Aug-08 Aug-09 Aug-10 Aug-11 Aug-12 Aug-13 Aug-14 
Oct-2007=100 
B.  LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIO IN RELATIVE TERMS (a) 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
Dec-07 Nov-08 Oct-09 Sep-10 Aug-11 Jul-12 Jun-13 May-14 
 NET SUBSCRIPTIONS  RETURN 
B. CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE IN NET ASSET VALUE OF RETURN  
     AND OF NET SUBSCRIPTIONS 
  
% 
SOURCE: INVERCO. 
INVESTMENT FUNDS CHART 2.8
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
A. ASSETS OF INVESTMENT FUNDS   
€bn 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2014
The stability of retail funding, along with the ongoing decline in credit, has made possible 
in recent years a marked trend towards a reduction of the retail funding gap of deposit 
institutions, i.e. the difference between lending and deposits. This trend has been 
continuous since 2007, with the odd sharper drop in December 2012 as a result of the 
transfer to Sareb of real estate assets of Group 1 banks. Since 2007 the loan-deposit gap 
has decreased by nearly 40% (see Chart 2.7.B).
The financial market conditions prevailing in recent months, along with a low interest rate 
environment, may have had an influence on economic agents’ decisions about where to 
place their savings and on banks’ marketing strategies, by raising the appeal of products 
which, although not perfect substitutes for bank deposits because of their high risk, 
compete with them in attracting those savings.
Thus, throughout 2014 the net assets of investment funds tended to increase (see Chart 2.8.A), 
rising by more than €25 billion in the first two quarters of 2014. This expansion arose 
mainly from an increase in net subscriptions (see Chart 2.8.B). The contribution from yields 
was also positive in all months of the year, but accounts to a lesser degree for the rise in 
investment funds’ total net assets.
In the first half of 2014 Spanish deposit institutions recorded consolidated income of €7,886 
million (see Table 2.2), short of the somewhat more than €8.2 billion in the same period of 
2013 (fall of 4.6%). However, profitability in terms of assets, ROA, was 0.47% compared 
with 0.45% last year. Meanwhile, profitability in terms of equity, ROE, was 7%, somewhat 
below that of 7.8% at June 2013, largely as a result of the increase in own funds. 
Profit before tax in terms of ATA increased by 12 bp from June 2013 to June 2014, when 
it reached 0.73%. The main factors contibuting to that increase in terms of average 
assets (see Chart 2.9.A) were net interest income, up by 12 bp in the period, and smaller 
asset impairment losses, the relative weight of which decreased by nearly 10 bp between 
June 2013 and June 2014, meaning that they reduced operating income by a smaller 
percentage (see Chart 2.9.B). These factors having a positive impact on income before 
tax were partially offset by a decrease in the average return on financial transactions (see 
Chart 2.9.A). 
...while the funding gap of 
the retail sector has continued 
to decrease
2.2 Profitability
Spanish deposit institutions 
recorded consolidated income 
of €7,886 million in the first 
half of 2014
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A closer look at the main income statement items shows that in the first six months of 2014 
net interest income was slightly lower than in the same period of the previous year (1.1%). 
Although the return on investment decreased by 8.6%, the containment of the cost of 
financing the related assets allowed total financial costs to be reduced by 16.3% with 
respect to the same period of the previous year. As a result, deposit institutions ended the 
first half of 2014 with net interest income of more than €30 billion. Net return on investment 
measured in terms of ATA stood at 1.83%, against 1.71% at June 2013.
Net interest income fell more sharply year-on-year at June 2014 in business in Spain than 
in business abroad. The difference between the average return on investment and the 
average cost of liabilities held steady between June 2013 and June 2014, in contrast to 
what happened in the period between June 2012 and June 2013 (see Chart 2.10.A), so the 
fall in net interest income in Spain is basically due to lower activity, against a background of 
declining credit (see Chart 2.10.B). Additionally, Chart 2.10.C shows that, for new operations, 
the marginal rate on assets decreased by less than the marginal rate on liabilities, reaffirming 
the favourable tendency observed in the difference between average rates.
The gross income of deposit institutions in the first half of 2014 amounted to somewhat 
more than €50 billion, 7.1% less than for the first six months of 2013. Measured as a 
proportion of assets, gross income amounted to 2.96%, compared with 2.98% in the 
same period a year earlier. The main reasons for this drop in absolute value are the 
behaviour of net commissions and of gains (losses) on financial assets and liabilities.
Net interest income decreased 
year-on-year at June 2014…
…basically due to a decrease 
in activity
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Jun-13 Jun-14
€m
% Change
Jun-14/Jun-13
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 56,091 -8.6 3.36 3.32
Financial costs 25,234 -16.3 1.65 1.49
Net interest income 30,856 -1.1 1.71 1.83
Return on equity instruments 919 43.7 0.03 0.05
Share of pro?t or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method 1,677 -42.6 0.16 0.10
Net commissions 11,155 -4.1 0.64 0.66
Gains and losses on ?nancial assets and liabilities 7,021 -23.3 0.50 0.42
Other operating income -1,375 . -0.08 -0.08
Gross income 50,253 -7.1 2.96 2.98
Operating expenses 23,943 -8.2 1.43 1.42
Net operating income 26,310 -6.0 1.53 1.56
)snoisivorp lareneg dna cificeps( sessol tnemriapmi tessA 13,696 -19.2 0.93 0.81
Provisioning expense (net) 1,396 -42.4 0.13 0.08
Operating pro?t 11,219 30.2 0.47 0.66
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and receivables) 2,269 4.9 0.12 0.13
Income from disposals (net) 3,396 -26.4 0.25 0.20
Pro?t before tax 12,346 11.6 0.61 0.73
Net income 9,126 -3.5 0.52 0.54
Memorandum item:
    Income attributable to the controlling entity 7,886 -4.6 0.45 0.47
Jun-14
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
Deposit institutions. January-June 2014
TABLE 2.2 
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The contribution of net commissions to the income statement was down slightly compared 
with that at June 2013 (–4.1%), although the percentage in terms of assets was practically 
the same. The downward trend in the volume of business may largely account for the 
continuous moderation in this item, since the largest fall in the period was that of 
commissions for collection and payment services (–6.6% between June 2013 and June 
2014) and at the same time they account for a larger proportion of commission income 
(see Chart 2.11.A), whereas those arising from securities services and from non-bank 
financial product sales performed favourably, in line with the trend shown by financial 
products of this type (see Chart 2.8).
The other major factor in explaining the fall in gross income is gains and losses on financial 
assets and liabilities. Given the large volume of this item in the first half of 2013 (somewhat 
more than €9 billion), the more than €7 billion recorded in 2014 (60% of which came from 
available-for-sale assets and nearly 20% from the trading portfolio, see Chart 2.11.B) 
represented a decrease of 23.3% in this item with respect to the previous year.
In line with the downtrend prevailing to date, net operating income at June 2014 was down 
by 6% with respect to that of 2013, standing at around €26.3 billion. Operating expenses 
Net commissions held steady 
in terms of average assets, 
although they decreased in 
absolute value between June 
2013 and June 2014
Gains and losses on financial 
assets and liabilities also 
decreased year-on-year
Operating expenses were cut, 
the number of employees...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Marginal interest rates refer to those established in transactions initiated or renewed in the previous reference month. The transactions are weighted according 
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decreased by 8.2%7 with respect to June 2013. The trend initiated in 2009 of containment 
of operating expenses continued as a result of a reduction in the number of employees 
and offices, as seen in Chart 2.10.D, which shows that the levels of both variables are 
below those at the beginning of the past decade. The decreases with respect to the peak 
in 2008 are of nearly 25% in staff and of nearly 30% in number of offices. This process of 
operating cost containment shown by deposit institutions is expected to continue, due 
particularly to the compulsory nature of the restructuring plans established as a result of 
the European financial assistance programme for recapitalising the Spanish banking 
system. Operating expenses were reduced both in Spain and abroad, although more 
moderately so abroad.
Provisioning losses arising from valuation adjustments to assets (specific and general 
provisions) decreased by 19.2% with respect to June 2013. The more moderate growth of 
NPLs and the high provisions recorded by banks in prior periods (particularly in 2012 and, 
in some cases, in the first half of 2013 as a result of the accounting reclassification of 
forborne loans) explain this lesser need to record provisions in the first half of 2014. 
After stringent provisioning (as a result of RDL 2/2012 and RDL 18/2012) with provisioning 
charges of more than twice net operating income, the current charge stands at 52% of net 
operating income (see Chart 2.9.B). The losses arising from impairment of assets other 
than loans and receivables (including those arising from provisions for losses on foreclosed 
assets) increased slightly compared with those at June 2013. Specifically, they increased 
by 4.9% to €2,269 million.
In short, deposit institutions managed to withstand the pressure put on their income 
statements by very low interest rates, smaller volumes of business and a still-high level 
of non-earning assets. They have done so by the containment of operating costs and the 
lower provisions made possible by more moderate increases in NPLs. In that setting, 
with limited room for manoeuvre, a policy of cost containment and increased efficiency 
must act as the guiding principle for banks in the near future so they can sustain their 
profitability levels.
...and offices decreasing 
in business in Spain
Losses arising from asset 
valuation adjustments 
decreased with respect 
to June 2013...
...and reduced net operating 
income by a smaller 
percentage
BREAKDOWN OF COMMISSIONS REVENUE AND GAINS AND LOSSES ON FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
Deposit institutions. June 2014 
CHART 2.11
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A. BREAKDOWN OF COMMISSIONS REVENUE 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
7  This year-on-year fall is sharper due to the staff adjustment processes of various banks in 2013, which had their 
strongest impact on operating expenses in that year.
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2014 saw the first-time application of the new prudential standards on solvency issued by 
the Basel Committee, generally known as Basel III. Basel III builds on Basel II (Banco de 
España Circular 3/2008), modifying some of its elements and, in particular, adding new 
prudential tools. Basel III has been transposed into European legislation through Directive 
2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 (incorporated into Spanish law through Law 10/2014 of 26 
June 2014 on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions, which will 
subsequently be implemented via a royal decree and a Banco de España circular) and 
Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 20138 (directly applicable in Member States).
As regards regulatory capital, the basic objectives of the new legislation are not only to 
establish higher own funds requirements for banks, but also to improve the quality of their 
own funds, i.e. their capacity to absorb losses. Other additional objectives are to establish 
internationally uniform definitions of capital and to enhance transparency.
The new legislation on own funds establishes two levels of capital: tier 1 and tier 2. The former 
includes common equity tier 1 (CET1), which is the category with the highest quality. The 
quality of capital has been improved by tightening the requirements for eligible instruments to 
count as CET1 and by extending the deductions of items not qualifying as CET1.9 
The new requirements ensure the quality of common equity and therefore considerably 
enhance its capacity to absorb losses, which is the prime purpose of the new capital 
regulation. Although to a lesser extent, improvements are also made in the capture of risk, 
the denominator of the capital ratio, thereby tightening particularly the treatment of risk 
arising from the trading portfolio.
Another way of increasing banks’ capacity to absorb capital losses is through the 
modification of the required minimum thresholds. In this connection, Basel III has 
substantially increased the regulatory ratio for common equity. The new legislation 
introduces a specific new capital requirement based on CET1, which is set at 4.5% and 
will rise to 7% when the capital conservation buffer is applied in full.10 Note that another 
series of buffers is established, such as the requirements for systemically important banks 
(see Box 2.4) which, as and when they are activated, could raise the minimum regulatory 
requirements above that 7%. Also, other macroprudential tools, such as the counter-
cyclical buffer (see Chapter 4) or the systemic buffer, are made available to the competent 
authorities.
Given the aforementioned requirements, CET1 has become the market benchmark for 
judging bank solvency, while additional tier 1 capital (AT1) and tier 2 capital are tending to 
be given less importance.
The total tier 1 capital requirement (CET1 + AT1) for regulatory purposes is set at 6% and 
the total capital requirement (tier 1 and tier 2) is set at 8%, i.e. maintaining the original 
Basel II requirement. Finally, banks will adapt gradually to the new legislation, completing 
the process at the beginning of 2019.
2.3 Solvency
Basel III has been transposed 
to European legislation 
through Directive 2013/36/EU 
of 26 June 2013 and 
Regulation (EU) 575/2013 
of 26 June 2013
The new solvency 
requirements ensure the 
quality of common equity 
and thus considerably 
enhance its capacity to absorb 
losses, which is the primary 
purpose of the new capital 
regulation
8   As well as the Binding Technical Standards (BTS) of the European Banking Authority on specific aspects of the 
legislation.
9   For example, according to the new legislation the items which must be deducted in full from CET1 (although, 
due to transitional adjustments, deduction in full will not generally take place until 2018) are: goodwill and other 
intangible assets, deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and holdings of own shares including 
contractual obligations to purchase own shares.
10  The envisaged implementation schedule specifies that the capital conservation buffer shall be 0.625% in 2016, 
1.25% in 2017, 1.875% in 2018 and, as its definitive level, 2.5% from 1 January 2019.
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Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 (CRD IV), transposing Basel III into EU 
legislation, sets out additional capital requirements for institutions 
classified as global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs).
In accordance with Article 131, a methodology shall be developed 
to identify systemically important institutions and classify them 
into five different buckets on the basis of their systemic importance. 
The lowest bucket shall be assigned a specific capital requirement 
of 1% of the total risk exposure amount. The requirement shall 
gradually increase in tranches of 0.5 pp up to a potential level of 
3.5% for the highest bucket of G-SIIs.
Since the approval of Basel III, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have 
been working together on developing and assessing a methodology 
for the identification and categorisation of systemically important 
institutions.1
The methodology developed by the BCBS and the FSB determines 
that competent authorities may exercise their supervisory judgment 
to classify any institution belonging to the initial population2 as 
systemically important even if, using the established quantitative 
method, the institution does not reach the cut-off score of the 
lowest bucket (additional capital surcharge of 1%).
The score is an average of five variables or indicators, namely size, 
interconnectedness, substitutability/infrastructure, complexity and 
cross-border activity, each of which receives an equal weighting.
The size indicator is the exposure measure defined for the 
leverage ratio under Basel III (December 2012 definition). The 
interconnectedness indicator is based on intra-financial system 
assets and liabilities and on financial instruments outstanding. 
The substitutability/infrastructure indicator relies on each bank’s 
payments activity, assets under custody and underwriting of 
financial instruments; the contribution of the substitutability/
infrastructure indicator to the total G-SII score is capped at 500 bp. 
The complexity indicator is determined by positions in OTC 
derivatives, by the total amount of the trading book and available-
for-sale securities and, finally, by level 3 assets.3 The cross-border 
activity indicator is based on cross-jurisdictional claims and liabilities.
For each bank, the score for a particular indicator is calculated as 
the ratio (in basis points) of the relevant variable – for example, 
exposure – to the aggregate amount of that variable for all the 
banks in the sample. If an indicator is based on more than one 
variable, the score is calculated as the simple average of the 
individual scores of each constituent variable.
Institutions are grouped into buckets on the basis of their total G-SII 
score: those with a score below 130 bp are excluded from the G-SII 
category, while those that score over 130 bp are grouped into the 
G-SII buckets (bucket 1 and above) based on successive 100 bp 
increases over that minimum threshold.
The classification by buckets resulting from the scores obtained 
based on this methodology and supervisory judgment at end-
2013, which will be published shortly by the FSB and the BCBS, 
will determine the additional capital requirement to increase the 
loss-absorbing capacity of systemically important institutions, 
which will be phased in progressively between 2016 and 2019. In 
other words, if an institution is included in the first bucket with an 
additional capital requirement of 1% in 2016, its minimum capital 
ratio will increase by 0.25 pp in that year, and by 0.25 pp in each 
of the three subsequent years.
BOX 2.4CAPITAL SURCHARGE FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS
1  The methodology published by the Basel Committee is available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
2  The BCBS requires that banks with exposure exceeding €200 billion at 
end-2012 submit the information needed to compute their score as 
G-SIIs.
3  Level 1 assets are those valued using quoted prices in active markets 
that the institution can access. Level 2 assets are measured using inputs 
other than quoted prices that are directly or indirectly observable. Prices 
of level 3 assets are unobservable.
The information given below is drawn from the first prudential reporting by Spanish banks 
under the new regulatory framework.11 It shows that the common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 
Spanish deposit institutions at June 2014 at aggregate level was 11.6% (see Chart 2.12). This 
ratio amply exceeds the regulatory requirement stated above. The ratio takes into account the 
transitional adjustments conceived to facilitate its progressive application.12 The tier 1 capital 
(CET1 + AT1) ratio was the same (11.6%) due to the effect of the gradual transitional 
adjustments, particularly those relating to deductions.13 The implementation schedule 
The common equity tier 1 
(CET1) ratio of Spanish 
deposit institutions at June 
2014 at aggregate level was 
11.6%, amply exceeding the 
regulatory requirement
11  Since it is the first prudential reporting upon the entry into force of the new regulatory framework, an inter-period 
comparative analysis cannot be made.
12  In accordance with the provisions of Circular 2/2014 on the exercise of various regulatory options contained in 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
13  The main transitional adjustments in quantitative terms relate to the deduction of intangible assets and the next 
most important ones concern the deduction of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability.
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generally specifies that in 2014 only 20% of these amounts is to be deducted from common 
equity and that the other 80% is to be deducted from additional tier 1 capital. Furthermore, 
the total capital ratio of 13.4% was also above the regulatory requirement (see Chart 2.12).
In absolute terms, the amount of CET1 in excess of the regulatory requirement stands at 
more than €100 billion, while in terms of total capital this excess is around €89 billion (see 
Chart 2.13.A). The capital metrics indicate that the type of capital which has been most 
strengthened is that of higher quality, i.e. common equity tier 1 (CET1), in line with the 
closer attention it receives from regulators and from the market. Thus CET1 represented 
87% of total capital (see Chart 2.13.B). Meanwhile, under the new regulatory criteria for 
measuring risk exposure, Spanish deposit institutions had aggregate risk-weighted assets 
of €1,651 billion at June 2014 (see Chart 2.13.A), amounting to 47% of their total assets.
Looking at the composition of common equity, as regards regulatory capital, the 
quantitatively most significant items are equity instruments (47%) and reserves (26%). Next 
come transitional adjustments (20%), an item which will persist for the period of application 
of the transitional provisions set out in Part 10 of the EU Regulation. Minority interests and 
other items account for 6%. As regards deductions, the main items are those relating to 
goodwill and other intangible assets (52%), followed by deferred tax assets (17%) and 
other deductions (31%). Chart 2.13.C shows this structure in terms of risk-weighted assets.
Finally, turning to the composition of risk-weighted assets, credit risk is clearly the main 
component (85%). Operational risk (10%) and position, exchange rate and commodity risk 
(5%) are the next most important in quantitative terms, while other risks account for less 
than 1% of risk-weighted assets (see Chart 2.13.D).
The usual market indicators show that the share prices of Spanish banks performed 
favourably throughout 2014. All of them posted gains and most of them performed more 
strongly than their European peers, which advanced more unevenly (see Chart 2.14.A). As 
a result of this favourable performance, the price-to-book ratios of Spanish banks continued 
to improve. As regards this metric, some Spanish banks are in strong positions with respect 
to their European peers, while others are in an intermediate position (see Chart 2.14.B). Box 
2.5 compares the main Spanish banks (those directly supervised by the ECB from 4 
November 2014) with those directly supervised by the ECB in other euro area countries.
The capital metrics indicate 
that the type of capital which 
has been most strengthened 
is that of higher quality, i.e. 
common equity tier 1 (CET1)
 Within regulatory capital, 
equity instruments are the 
most significant item along 
with reserves, while the main 
deductions are those 
associated with goodwill and 
other intangible assets
The usual market indicators 
show that the share prices 
of Spanish banks performed 
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while their price-to-book ratios 
continue to improve
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of less than €16 billion in 2013, negatively affected by losses in the 
Irish, Cypriot, Slovenian and Portuguese banks, and particularly in 
the Italian banks which recognised losses of more than €21 billion. 
In 2013 the Spanish banks topped the euro area ranking in terms 
of return on equity (ROE, defined as net income/total equity; see 
Panel B). They also held a leading position among the main 
European countries on cost/income ratio (operating expenses/
gross operating income) (see Panel C).
In the case of solvency, the core Tier 1 ratio of the Spanish banks 
as at December 2013 in accordance with the solvency regulations 
in force in 2013 (11.7%) was medium/low in comparison with the 
euro area countries, just short of the European average (11.9%), 
very close to the French figure and ahead of Italy (see Panel D). 
However, in terms of leverage (total equity/total assets) the 
opposite is the case, as Spain’s figure of 6.8% is 1.5 pp above the 
European average (see Panel E).
In terms of the ratio of provisioning to customer loans, the 
provisioning rate of Spain’s banks (5.6%) is almost 1 pp higher than 
the European average (4.7%), below the coverage rates of Italy and 
Portugal but above those of France and Germany (see Panel F).
Lastly, the hypothetical credit rating4 of the group of Spanish 
banks directly supervised by the SSM (Baa3 according to Moody’s 
and BBB- according to Standard & Poor’s, which in both cases is 
the step immediately above speculative or high-yield, and between 
BBB and BBB+ according to Fitch, which is two or three steps 
above that level) would be between two and three steps below the 
credit rating of all the banks directly supervised by the SSM overall 
(between A3 and Baa1 according to Moody’s, A- according to 
Standard & Poor’s, and between A and A- according to Fitch). The 
difference largely reflects the different sovereign risk ratings across 
the European countries.
To sum up, the Spanish banks directly supervised by the SSM, 
which account for 90% of the total assets of Spain’s deposit-
taking institutions, hold a leading position in terms of profitability 
and cost/income vis-à-vis the banks of other European countries. 
Their solvency ratios are below the European average, but they 
have lower levels of leverage.
On 4 September the ECB published the list1 of significant banks 
that will be directly supervised by the ECB in the framework of the 
SSM. This box, based on information obtained directly from the 
SNL Financial database2 as at December 2013, contains a 
comparative analysis of the banks directly supervised by the SSM, 
with the data aggregated at the country level.3 
In terms of total assets of the banks directly supervised by the 
SSM, the Spanish banks account for 14.5% of the total, in third 
place behind France (31.6%) and Germany (21%) (see Panel A) 
and ahead of Italy (10.6%) and the Netherlands (9.1%). These five 
countries account for 87% of the assets to be directly supervised 
by the SSM, with the remaining 13% being divided between the 
other 13 countries. In terms of customer loans and deposits, the 
relative weight of Spain’s banks (18.5% in loans and 20.4% in 
deposits) has increased, placing them second behind France and 
ahead of Germany. This is due, in part, to the different balance 
sheet structures of the banks. For example, loans to customers 
account for almost 60% of assets in Spain (and Italy), while in 
France and Germany the figure is around 36%. Likewise, customer 
deposits account for 55% of assets in Spain, while in France and 
Germany the figure is around 32%.
In terms of profitability, in 2013 the overall net income obtained by 
the Spanish banks directly supervised by the SSM amounted to 
approximately €13 billion, in comparison with the substantial 
losses recorded in 2012. This figure places them second in Europe, 
topped only by the French banks whose net income amounted to 
more than €17 billion. Overall, the banks directly supervised by the 
SSM for which SNL Financial has data available posted net income 
BOX 2.5COMPARISON AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL OF THE BANKS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED BY THE SSM 
1  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssm-listofsupervisedentities
1409en.pdf?59d76de0c5663687f594250ebf228c6b.
2  The coverage provided by SNL Financial differs according to the 
variables considered, ranging from data available for 111 of the 120 
banks in the case of assets and income, to data available for 99 banks 
in the case of loan provisioning. Accordingly, the quantitative analysis 
must be viewed with some caution. The definitions of the variables and 
the concepts included in each variable do not coincide exactly with 
those used in the results from the Comprehensive Assessment included 
in Chapter 3. For example, the core Tier 1 ratio as at December 2013 
contained in SNL is that published by the banks in accordance with the 
legislation applicable in 2013, while that recently published in the 
Comprehensive Assessment includes the current regulations for the 
CET1 ratio as at December 2013, which means that they are not directly 
comparable.
3  The list of 120 entities includes 21 German banks, 15 Spanish banks, 14 
Italian banks, ten French banks, eight Austrian banks, seven Dutch and 
seven Belgian banks, five Luxembourg banks, four Portuguese, four Irish, 
four Greek and four Cypriot banks, three Finnish, three Slovenian, three 
Slovakian, three Latvian and three Maltese banks and two Estonian banks.
4  Calculated on the basis of the credit ratings, assigned by each credit 
rating agency for each bank, included in early September in SNL 
Financial, aggregated by weighting each bank by its total assets as at 
December 2013, both for the Spanish banks overall and the European 
banks overall.
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3  COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEM
Between November 2013 and October 2014, the ECB performed a detailed assessment of 
the euro area banking system, in preparation for assuming responsibility for supervision in 
November 2014 within the framework of the SSM. The assessment had three main goals:
—  To achieve greater transparency in the balance sheets of European banks to 
facilitate a more correct assessment of their solvency.
—  To identify and implement any corrective measure necessary to ensure 
solvency in the short term.
— To restore confidence in the European banking system.
This comprehensive assessment process is based essentially on two pillars:
—  An asset quality review (AQR), which aims to enhance the transparency and 
knowledge of the banks’ exposures, including an assessment of the level of 
provisioning to correct asset impairment and a reassessment of collateral 
valuation.
—  A stress test, in collaboration with the EBA, that was designed to assess 
the resilience of the banks, that is, their solvency, understood as their 
capacity to absorb future losses under two scenarios, one baseline and 
one adverse.
The ECB performed this assessment in close collaboration with the national supervisory 
authorities, within the framework of the SSM. The exercise covered 130 credit institutions 
in 18 Member States plus Lithuania, with a total volume of assets of more than €22 trillion.
Once the assessment was complete, the main results obtained were published in an 
aggregate report, with data on each institution assessed, along with the pertinent 
supervisory recommendations according to the results obtained. This chapter deals first 
with the basic elements of the assessment exercise, before analysing the main outcomes. 
The reference date taken for the AQR was December 2013. The exercise was very broad 
in scope and included various kinds of risks, exposures and borrowers (exposures to 
domestic borrowers and exposures arising from banks’ business abroad, both within and 
beyond the euro area).
The main focus of the AQR was to analyse the balance sheet items that posed the most 
risk for banks, together with those that were least well known or least transparent.
In order to ensure that a significant part of credit institutions’ balance sheets was analysed, 
certain minimum coverage criteria were employed at the bank level (50% of risk-weighted 
assets). The sampling of the portfolio selections was also subject to minimum requirements. 
Given the numerical nature of the exercise, a data integrity validation was also undertaken 
to ensure the quality and consistency of the data.
The ECB has assessed 
the euro area banking sector, 
as a prior step to the start 
of the SSM
The process consists 
of an asset quality review …
… and a stress test
The ECB performed this 
comprehensive assessment 
in collaboration with 
the national supervisory 
authorities 
3.1  Details of the basic 
elements of the 
comprehensive 
assessment exercise 
3.1.1 ASSET QUALITY REVIEW
The AQR focused on the 
highest-risk, least well-known 
and least transparent balance 
sheet items, applying certain 
minimum coverage criteria
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2014
The AQR exercise1 had two key phases: portfolio selection and execution.
The first phase was essential to ensure that exposures with the highest risk were subject 
to in-depth review. In this phase, the national supervisory authorities proposed the 
portfolios to be reviewed, for each institution and on the basis of the most appropriate risk 
assessments. As indicated above, these proposals were subject to minimum coverage 
criteria. The portfolio selections proposed by the national authorities were then reviewed 
by the ECB, not only on the basis of information arising from supervisory data, but also on 
the basis of macro-financial analysis and other information obtained from a specific 
exercise conducted on the selected portfolios.
Once the exposures to be assessed had been selected, the AQR was performed in several 
stages:
First, the review of processes, policies and accounting was carried out to ensure that the 
banks had a clearly defined set of policies and processes for the correct interpretation of 
accounting rules or other kinds of similar standards in areas where possible errors of 
interpretation in asset valuation were most likely to arise.
This was followed by the validation of the integrity of the databases created by the banks 
specifically for this exercise, using a series of automatic verifications designed by the 
ECB.
Before being reviewed the credit files were sampled, using statistical techniques and in 
accordance with international audit standards. The goal was to ensure the viability of the 
exercise, reducing the size of the exposure to be analysed.
A key part of the AQR exercise was to verify that the loans in the selected portfolios were 
correctly classified and that the provisioning levels were appropriate. The aim was to 
detect any possible errors in the classification of exposures, which might be assigned to 
the wrong portfolio or incorrectly classified as performing or non-performing. The analysis 
also included ascertaining whether there was adequate specific provisioning and, therefore, 
identifying whether the assets (and, where appropriate, impairment thereof) were correctly 
valued. Additionally, the collateral provided was also analysed, to ensure that it was 
correctly valued.
The findings from the credit file review were projected from the sample to the rest of the 
selected portfolio, using the agreed accounting extrapolation criteria.
The next step was the calculation of collective provisioning, analysing both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms the method used to assess the level of each bank’s collective 
provisioning requirements (provisions whose aim is to cover losses incurred but not yet 
reported in a specific transaction, although for the purposes of the exercise, specific-
provision coverage of retail portfolios was also included in collective provisioning). The 
(collective) provisioning levels were compared with a model developed by the ECB; where 
significant differences in these levels were identified and not justified, additional 
provisioning was required.
First phase: portfolio selection
Second phase: execution, 
which in turn consisted of 
several stages:
review of processes,…
… data integrity validation,…
… sampling,…
… review of credit files, 
provisioning levels 
and collateral,… 
… extrapolation of findings, …
… calculation 
of collective provisioning,…
1  Details of the AQR methodology are available on the ECB website: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
assetqualityreviewphase2manual201403en.
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The process also included a review of level 3 assets, which was focused on ensuring that, 
in view of the nature of these exposures, the banks were correctly calculating their fair 
value. Foreclosed assets were also reviewed.
The last stage consisted in collating the findings, to ensure that they were consistent and 
comparable across portfolios and banks and to determine the impact (including possible 
adjustments) that the results of the different stages of the execution phase might have 
on CET1 as at December 2013, which was the starting point for the stress testing 
exercise.
In addition to the CET1 adjustments, the most important and significant findings from 
the AQR were also incorporated into the stress testing exercise, particularly the findings 
that had an impact on fundamental elements such as the probability of default, loss-
given default and provisioning levels. These adjustments — the Join-up — are described 
below.
Lastly, to ensure that the AQR was consistent throughout, a strict quality assurance policy 
was followed. The aim was to ensure not only that the process was appropriate but also 
that it was applied consistently to all the banks involved, to be certain that they were all 
treated equally.
The stress tests were conducted in coordination between the ECB, the EBA (design of the 
methodology, data centralisation, publication of results), the ESRB (design of the adverse 
macroeconomic scenario), the European Commission (design of the baseline macroeconomic 
scenario) and the national supervisory authorities which provided support for the exercise (data 
compilation, management and supervision of the exercise, interaction with the banks, quality 
assurance and consolidation of findings).
The exercise considered two scenarios, one baseline and one adverse, both over a 
three-year horizon (2014-2016; see Charts 3.1.A and B). The adverse scenario reflects, 
for the whole of the EU, a cumulative decline in the rate of change of GDP of 2.1%, 
an unemployment rate of 13% in 2016 and long-term government bond yields around 
4.4%.
In the case of Spain, the adverse scenario was a cumulative decline in the rate of change 
of GDP of 1.2% over the three-year horizon, an unemployment rate of 27.1% in 2016 and 
long-term government bond yields in the area of 5.6%.
The baseline scenario for 2014 and 2015 was based on the European Commission’s 2014 
winter forecasts; for 2016 a specific model was built. 
It is important to note that the adverse scenario did not reflect European banking supervisors’ 
core expectations, but was rather an extreme but possible scenario, with a low possibility 
of occurrence, that could result if certain systemic risks were to materialise in the banking 
sector. In particular, the adverse scenario reflected an increase in investor risk aversion, 
which would trigger an overall increase in the returns required of long-term investments 
(including government bonds) and asset depreciation, especially in emerging countries. 
This adverse impact would be further fuelled by credit impairment in countries with weak 
domestic demand and a weak banking sector, and by a slowdown in structural reforms and 
the need to rationalise banks’ balance sheets.
… review of level 3 assets, 
foreclosed assets, and …
… final CET1 adjustment
Both the CET1 adjustments 
resulting from the analysis 
and the most significant 
findings from the AQR were 
incorporated into the stress 
testing exercise 
Strict quality assurance 
in the AQR 
3.1.2  STRESS TESTING 
OF EUROPEAN BANKS
3.1.2.1 Scenarios
The adverse scenario 
did not reflect supervisory 
expectations, but was rather 
an extreme but possible 
scenario, with a low possibility 
of occurrence, scenario that 
could result if certain systemic 
risks were to materialise 
in the banking sector
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In the stress tests, CET1 is the measure used to assess the solvency of the participating 
banks. Specifically, the target ratio used in the exercise is the CET1/RWA (risk-weighted 
assets) ratio, calculated using the current regulatory definition (current regulations and 
Capital Directive). The capital elements subject to transitional provisions are identified 
separately and publicly disclosed. The minimum capital requirement ratios under the 
baseline and the adverse scenario are 8% and 5.5%, respectively; these thresholds must 
be met after a capital benchmark of 8% has been met in the AQR.
The stress testing exercise follows a bottom-up approach, with each bank conducting 
the stress test using the common methodology for all institutions published by the EBA.2 
This methodology determines how to calculate the impact on capital of credit risk, 
market risk, securitisations, the cost of funding and the performance of the profit and 
loss account.
Under the stress tests, banks had to apply the macroeconomic scenarios to future loan 
losses over the 2014-2016 horizon, using statistical and econometric models that link the 
macroeconomic variables with the main elements that determine credit risk in the banks’ 
portfolios, i.e. probability of default (PD) and loss-given default (LGD). The projected rates 
were used to calculate default flows and, consequently, the provisions needed to cover the 
credit impairment. For its part, the ECB provided the institutions with credit benchmarks 
based on a statistical model of its own, with aggregate data at country level adjusted to a 
sufficiently conservative confidence level. Banks that did not have their own credit models, 
or whose credit models were not appropriate, had to use the results obtained with the 
ECB’s model.
The exercise was based on the assumption of static balance sheets as at end-2013. In 
other words, it was not possible to grant new loans, or to remove non-performing assets 
from the balance sheet, or to alter the maturities structure (replacing matured exposures 
with others with the same characteristics), unless a restructuring plan had been approved 
by the European Commission before January 2014. In any event, the calculation of RWAs 
for the period 2014-2016 had to reflect the deterioration in credit quality and, essentially 
for this reason, RWAs for credit risk could not be expected to remain constant.
3.1.2.2 Capital thresholds
CET1 is used to measure 
solvency, with minimum ratios 
of 8% and 5.5% required 
under the baseline and the 
adverse scenario, respectively
3.1.2.3 Methodology
Each bank has conducted its 
own stress test (bottom-up 
approach) using a common 
methodology
Credit risk
Static balance sheet 
GDP AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE ADVERSE SCENARIO  CHART 3.1
SOURCE: EBA.  
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2  Details of the methodology used and the variables in the baseline and adverse scenarios for each of the countries 
included in the exercise are available on the EBA’s website: https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-
common-methodology-and-scenario-for-2014-eu-banks-stress-test.
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In general, banks with limited market activities (without VaR models for their portfolios, 
with capital requirements for market risk below 5%) had to use a simplified market risk 
approach (losses based on the historical standard deviation of net income from the trading 
book). Banks with more market activities had to use an advanced approach to calculate 
losses and adjustments to RWAs based on the revaluation of their trading book and their 
available-for-sale and fair value portfolios, in keeping with the market scenarios prepared 
by the ECB and the ESRB that are consistent with the macroeconomic scenarios. The 
advanced approach could not, in any circumstances, be less conservative than the 
simplified approach, as “floors” were established on losses. Moreover, no gains were 
allowed.
Deterioration in exposures towards securitisation on the loan portfolio were calculated by 
applying the credit risk methodology to the underlying assets and adding in the guarantees 
and other characteristics of the securitisation agreements.
In the case of sovereign exposures (loans to the public sector and fixed income in the 
held-to-maturity portfolio), losses were applied based on probability of default (PD) and 
loss-given default (LGD) provided by the ECB, consistent with the macroeconomic 
scenarios. Sovereign exposures in the available-for-sale and fair value portfolios were 
stressed by applying the market risk parameters and haircuts set by the ECB and the 
ESRB, in all cases in accordance with the adverse scenario. In the case of the available-
for-sale portfolio, applying the prudential filters agreed at the level of the Governing Council 
of the ECB, only 20% of the losses and gains from sovereign exposures affected capital in 
2014, followed by 40% in 2015 and 60% in 2016.
The static balance sheet hypothesis means that the profit and loss account, and specifically 
the calculation of net interest income over the 2014-2016 horizon, was essentially based 
on the projected interest rates for different kinds of loans and deposits. Banks had to draw 
up their own projections, being advised to reflect both macroeconomic factors (reference 
rates, market structure, etc.) and idiosyncratic factors (individual credit quality). Under the 
methodology used, there had to be a difference between the interest rates applied to 
positions existing in 2013 and those applied to new positions (renewals of matured 
transactions) in the course of the exercise (for example, the cost of wholesale funding, 
corporate deposits and retail deposits had to reflect at least 100%, 50% and 30%, 
respectively, of the increase in sovereign yields).
A further series of income and cost items was also projected by the banks, under the 
constraint that income (costs) did not increase (decrease) in comparison with the 2013 
level. Banks that did not have their own projection model had to use the historical average 
of their asset-related ratios to estimate income, choosing the most adverse ratios in the 
recent past in each case.
During August and September 2014, the ECB, with the collaboration of the national 
supervisors, performed exhaustive quality assurance of the stress test outcomes for each 
bank. In this process, the findings for each bank relating to credit risk, market risk, 
securitisations, net interest income and the profit and loss account were subjected to 
highly detailed checks. This was, in effect, a top-down review of the bottom-up exercise 
performed by the banks.
Thus, the ECB compared the risk parameters used by the banks arising from the AQR. It 
also compared the benchmark parameters in its internal models with the loss reported by 
Market risk
Securitisations
Sovereign risk
Profit and loss account
3.1.2.4 Quality assurance
Comprehensive validation of 
stress test outcomes
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each bank on each loan portfolio and performed an in-depth income and costs review, for 
which it also has its own model. 
The ECB also reviewed the models used by the banks to estimate risk parameters, including 
their statistical properties, reviewing the variables included (significance and expected 
signs) and the goodness of fit of the estimates (R squared, Durbin-Watson, etc.).
Lastly, the ECB compared the findings for each bank with the average of the banking 
sector of each country, making a painstaking analysis of the institutions with the largest 
deviations (less capital consumption).
Any deviations identified in the quality assurance process between the values estimated 
and reported by the banks and the benchmark values proposed by the ECB gave rise to 
demands for rectification, or for reasonable arguments to be made justifying the banks’ 
results in comparison with those estimated and proposed by the ECB. Specifically, if the 
deviations arose from a direct breach of the EBA methodology, the values reported by the 
institution were automatically replaced by the benchmark values proposed by the ECB, 
with the corresponding re-submission of the corrected calculations by the bank. In the case 
of quantitative deviations that did not directly breach the methodology but that had a 
significant impact on the final CET1, the banks concerned had to submit evidence justifying 
their results, in all cases in accordance with the rules laid down by the ECB, and if the 
explanations were unsatisfactory for the ECB, banks had to make the adjustments required 
to match the benchmark values. Quality assurance was a three-way process between 
individual institutions, the national supervisors and the ECB and, where appropriate, 
resulted in changes being made to the original reports produced by the banks.
To complete the exercise, the validated stress test outcomes had to be joined up with the 
results of the AQR. As indicated earlier, the results of the AQR implied changes in the 
starting level of CET1 for the stress testing exercise, and they were also used to adjust the 
projections of some of the key elements of the stress tests, such as the probability of 
default (PD) and loss-given default (LGD). Thus, reclassifying loans from performing to 
non-performing raised the starting level of PD in the stress tests, which in turn meant 
increasing projected PD, in the corresponding proportion, over the time horizon 
considered. All of which ultimately led to an overall adjustment of the final results, the 
impact of which was directly dependent on the extent of the corrections required to be 
made in the AQR process.
The ECB’s comprehensive assessment exercise covered 130 banks from 18 euro area 
countries, plus Lithuania. Of these, 15 are Spanish banks3 (accounting for somewhat more 
than 90% of the Spanish banking sector’s total assets), which places Spain as the second 
country, along with Italy, with most banks subject to the exercise.
As described in the first section of this chapter, devoted to explaining the methodology of 
the exercise, the starting point was the level of CET1 at year-end 2013. On this basis, the 
exercise estimated the impact that its different components entail, considering three 
thresholds: 8% of CET1 for the AQR, 8% of CET1 for the baseline scenario of the stress 
test (ST), and 5.5% of CET1 for the adverse scenario.
Quality assurance process: 
interplay between individual 
banks and supervisors which 
in many cases gave rise to 
changes in the original reports 
produced by the banks 
3.1.2.5 Join-up process: 
validated stress test outcomes 
joined up with the results 
of the AQR
3.2  Main results of the 
comprehensive 
assessment exercise
The ECB’s comprehensive 
assessment exercise covered 
130 banks, 15 of which are 
Spanish, from 18 euro area 
countries, plus Lithuania
3  The 15 Spanish participating banks were: Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, BFA/Bankia, Banco Popular, Sabadell, 
Kutxabank, Bankinter, Unicaja-CEISS, Abanca-NCG, Ibercaja, Catalunya Banc, BMN, Liberbank and Grupo 
Cajamar.
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Of the total of 130 European banks analysed, 25 showed a gross capital shortfall under one 
or more of the three thresholds considered (AQR, baseline ST or adverse ST). This shortfall 
entailed capital requirements of approximately €24.6 billion as at 31 December 2013. However, 
of these 25 banks with capital needs, 12 made capital increases during 2014 so only 13 of 
them showed a net capital shortfall. In short, the net capital shortfall resulting from the 
comprehensive assessment process is around €9.5 billion. Liberbank is the only Spanish 
bank on the list, with a capital shortfall of €32 million in the AQR that has already been 
covered by the capital measures taken by the bank in 2014 (for an amount of €637 million).
At the level of all the participating banks, in Spain’s case the impact of the AQR has been 
very limited. Specifically, it has consumed only 14 bp of the capital ratio, compared with 
42 bp for SSM banks on average. Indeed, Spain is the country evidencing the smallest 
capital correction in the AQR phase (see Chart 3.2.A). The net impact of the AQR was 
€33.8 billion for SSM banks as a whole, of which only €2.2 billion relate to Spanish banks. 
Following the 2012 comprehensive assessment exercise conducted in Spain (which 
contained an exhaustive asset quality review), and after both the extraordinary provisions 
set aside that year via Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012, and the measures taken 
in 2013 regarding the review of forborne loans, Spanish banks’ credit portfolios were 
revealed to be appropriately classified in terms of their credit quality (classification of loans 
as performing or non-performing), in relation to the value of the attendant collateral and to 
provisioning.
At the level of individual banks, the impact of the AQR, measured in bp of the CET1 ratio, 
varied from 105 bp to zero (see Chart 3.2.B). The capital ratio of virtually all the banks, after 
being subjected to the AQR, was clearly above the required 8% threshold, with the sole 
and above-mentioned exception of Liberbank, which at the end of the AQR was at 7.8%, 
entailing a capital shortfall of €32 million. As mentioned, this bank undertook various 
recapitalisation measures in 2014, which have already taken effect, for an amount of €637 
million. Accordingly, the previous shortfall has been more than compensated, and no 
further recapitalisation measure is needed for this bank.
The impact of the ST in the baseline scenario on Spanish banks translates into an increase 
in their capital ratio of around 120 bp (see Chart 3.3.A), while for the SSM aggregate the 
The net capital shortfall 
resulting from the 
comprehensive assessment 
process is approximately 
€9.5 billion; no Spanish bank 
has a net capital shortfall
The impact of the AQR has 
been very limited for Spanish 
banks, consuming 14 bp 
of the capital ratio, compared 
with 42 pp for SSM banks 
on average
Under the baseline scenario, 
Spanish banks would show...
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Net of tax effect.
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increase is approximately 30 bp. The impact on CET1 of the AQR and of the ST in the baseline 
scenario entailed, for Spanish banks as a whole, moving from an initial capital ratio in 2013 of 
10.6% to a ratio of 11.6%. On average, the SSM banks started the exercise with a ratio of 
11.7% and ended it slightly below that ratio, at around 11.6% (see Chart 3.3.B). Accordingly, 
despite their lower starting capital, at the end of the horizon the CET1 ratio of Spanish banks 
would converge on the SSM average, if the predictions envisaged in the baseline scenario 
were fulfilled. 
At the individual bank level, the increase in the CET1 ratio discussed in connection with the 
aggregate level was the case for 11 Spanish banks, falling for the remaining four banks. In 
any event, all Spanish banks completed the comprehensive assessment exercise under the 
baseline scenario above the minimum required level of 8% (see Chart 3.3.B).
The impact of the ST under the adverse scenario on Spanish banks’ CET1 ratio was 144 bp. 
This impact did not give rise to a capital shortfall at any Spanish bank. The impact of the ST on 
SSM banks as a whole was sharper and entailed, on average, a reduction in the CET1 ratio of 
almost 300 bp. In absolute terms, the net capital decline in Spain was €17.2 billion, in 
comparison with almost €182 billion for the SSM overall. At country level, the impact on the 
capital ratio under the adverse scenario in Spain was one of the lowest, and was in fact only 
lower in Latvia and Estonia (see Chart 3.4.A).
At the level of the results for individual banks, and as observed in the analysis of the AQR 
results, some degree of heterogeneity was discernible (see Chart 3.4.B). Thus, whereas for 
the bank with the least impact the outcome was hardly over 20 bp of the CET1 ratio, at the 
bank with the biggest impact it was 420 bp (a reduction of over 4 pp in the ratio), although 
only for one Spanish bank is the impact greater than that for the aggregate of SSM banks, 
which is practically 300 bp.
Finally, no Spanish bank, except Liberbank,4 has a final capital ratio in the adverse scenario 
below 7.5%, i.e. all the banks are 2 pp above the threshold set as the minimum solvency 
floor admissible in the comprehensive assessment exercise. 
... on aggregate an average 
capital ratio of 11.6% in 2016, 
meaning it would converge on 
the average for European 
banks
The impact of the ST under 
the adverse scenario subtracts 
144 bp from the capital ratio 
for Spanish banks and more 
than 300 bp for SSM banks 
on average
In general, Spanish banks 
were 2 pp above the minimum 
required threshold following 
the comprehensive 
assessment exercise under 
the adverse scenario
RESULTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT EXERCISE IN THE BASELINE SCENARIO CHART 3.3
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España. 
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4  If the capital measures taken in 2014 were borne in mind, Liberbank would exceed the minimum required level 
in the adverse scenario by more than 2 pp. 
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In short, for the 15 Spanish banks, the starting CET1 ratio in 2013 stood at 10.6% of their 
risk-weighted assets (RWAs), while for all SSM banks it was 11.7%, just over 1 pp higher. 
Under the adverse scenario, and including the AQR effect, the CET1 ratio for Spanish 
banks as a whole stood at 9% (see Chart 3.5.A), i.e. 3.5 pp above the threshold set by the 
ECB for the comprehensive assessment exercise in the adverse scenario (5.5% of CET1). 
The aggregate of SSM banks concluded the comprehensive assessment exercise with 
a CET1 ratio of 8.4% (3 pp above the threshold, see Chart 3.5.B). This outcome entails a 
more marked relative impact for SSM banks than for their Spanish counterparts: a reduction 
in the CET1 ratio of 3.4 pp for the SSM aggregate, compared with a reduction of 1.6 pp for 
the aggregate of Spanish banks.
The impact on capital of the 
adverse scenario would be 
far lower in Spain than 
the SSM average
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Net of tax effect.
RESULTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT EXERCISE IN THE ADVERSE SCENARIO CHART 3.4
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4  OTHER MATTERS
This chapter reports on the main advances made in various areas. The first section is devoted 
to a recent recommendation by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on the use in 
practice of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). The second section addresses the recent 
work by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on shadow banking. The third section looks at the 
main proposals by international agencies relating to international accounting standards. 
Box 4.1 compares the different models SSM countries are choosing for assigning resolution 
competences to one or more authorities. It reflects on the advantages and disadvantages 
of each of the models. As is analysed in detail in the Box, all SSM countries, with the 
exception of Finland, are opting to place the resolution authority under the same roof as 
the supervisory authority.
Finally, Box 4.2 describes different aspects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
It also looks at the organisational structures with which the ECB and DG Supervision of 
the Banco de España have equipped themselves to address the needs arising as from 
4 November this year with the effective entry into force of the SSM and the assumption of 
direct supervisory responsibilities by the ECB.
The ESRB, on which the Member States’ central banks and authorities overseeing banking, 
securities and insurance sit, along with representatives of various European authorities, is 
responsible for macroprudential supervision in the European Union. Much of the work of the 
ESRB in 2013 focused on the implementation of macroprudential instruments. The work took the 
form of various initiatives. Among these, the ESRB, in compliance with the provisions of the new 
European capital regulations, has issued a Recommendation on guidance for using the CCB, 
one of the macroprudential instruments whose implementation is at a most advanced stage.
The aim of the CCB is to ensure that the banking sector as a whole has sufficient capital 
to help maintain the flow of credit to the economy without the system’s solvency being 
jeopardised in the event of tension in the financial system brought on by a prior period of 
excessive credit growth.
The use of the CCB follows the “guided discretion” principle. This means that the use of 
an initial, quantitative and standardised benchmark indicator (the credit-to-GDP1gap ), 
which is selected for its capacity to act as a leading indicator of systemic banking crises, 
is complemented by other indicators, qualitative information and expert judgement, all of 
which structured by means of a set of principles.
In other words, to set the level of the CCB, the starting point is a “mechanical” benchmark 
indicator (the credit-to-GDP gap), with a rule in place, moreover, to connect different levels 
of this indicator with the benchmark buffer rate to be applied2 However, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision’s credit-to-GDP gap does not work the same in all settings and all 
countries alike. Therefore, in setting the CCB level, other possible specifications of the 
credit-to-GDP gap, other quantitative indicators and other qualitative factors should also be 
considered.
4.1  ESRB work 
on guidance for 
using the CCB
The CCB is one of the 
macroprudential instruments 
at a most advanced stage
1  The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the deviation by the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend.
2  Under this rule, the level of the CCB is 0% when the credit-to-GDP gap is below 2%, and thereafter the CCB rate 
increases linearly up to its maximum level of 2.5% when the credit-to-GDP gap reaches a value of 10%.
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resolution function would enable this task to benefit from the 
consequences arising from the EU Treaty-stipulated independent 
status of central banks.
The disadvantage of this model is that internal mechanisms are 
needed, if both functions are located in a single institution, to 
avoid conflicts of interest between those catered for by supervisory 
functions and the interests proper to resolution functions. 
The main advantage of an institutional arrangement under which 
the resolution authority is separate from the supervisory authority 
is that this directly prevents the potential emergence of the 
conflicts of interest referred to in the foregoing paragraph. 
Conversely, as a disadvantage, it involves creating risks of 
inefficiency, duplication and inconsistency with supervisory 
conduct.
Among the various alternatives offered by the Directive, the 
Member States have opted primarily for integrating the resolution 
authority into the banking authority, albeit establishing a 
governance regime that ensures sufficient segregation between 
resolution and supervision tasks (the “agency within an agency” 
model).
Using colour codes, Table A shows the distribution of resolution 
functions derived from the BRRD being undertaken in those 
SSM (euro area) countries on which information is available. For 
greater clarity, there is a separation, within the resolution 
framework, between the ongoing “prevention phase”, in which 
competences are closely linked to the current functions of the 
prudential supervisor, and the resolution phase in the strict 
sense of the term. 
As can be seen, all the SSM countries, with the sole exception of 
Finland, are opting to integrate the resolution authority into the 
supervisory authority (see Table A).
Among the EU countries, only Finland and Denmark envisage 
designating a resolution authority that is independent from the 
banking supervisor. In another two cases (Poland and Sweden) it 
is planned to distribute functions between the supervisory 
authority (preventive phase and/or activation of the resolution 
trigger) and another specifically designated authority with 
resolution functions.
The Resolution Directive (BRRD), which is currently being 
transposed into the legislation of most of the Member States, 
stipulates the formal designation of a national resolution authority 
by 31 December 2014. The resolution powers arising from the 
Single Resolution Mechanism shall then be attributed to this 
authority. 
The term “resolution” is understood to encompass the processes 
aimed at ensuring the continuity of the essential functions of 
banks deemed to be inviable at a given time, to preserve financial 
stability and to restore the viability of the bank in full or in part. 
There are two types of resolution measures: preventive action, 
involving ex-ante planning for all banks of the arrangements for 
their potential resolution should that become necessary; and the 
actual management of resolution, or resolution in the strict sense 
of the term.
Given the undoubted relatedness of this function to the tasks 
performed by banking supervisors, the Directive expressly 
acknowledges that the national prudential supervision authority 
may be designated as the national resolution authority, although 
organisational measures must be adopted to ensure operational 
independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between 
supervisory and resolution functions.
The most significant alternative model would involve the creation 
of a resolution agency separate from the prudential supervisor, 
with the possibility of distributing specific competences among 
more than one agency also been envisaged.
Each of the possible models has advantages and disadvantages.
The advantages of a model in which the resolution authority is part 
of the supervisory authority have to do with arguments of efficiency 
and institutional economics. In particular, this model lessens 
potential problems of coordination between supervisory or 
resolution-related measures that reduce their effectiveness in 
terms of preserving financial stability. It also offers greater flexibility 
by allowing immediate flows of resources from one function to 
another in view of particular needs at each point in time, and it 
minimises the risk of supervisory work being duplicated, especially 
in work relating to the preventive phase of resolution (i.e. before an 
institution is ruled to be non-viable). Finally, when the prudential 
supervisor is the central bank, the assumption by the latter of the 
BOX 4.1DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTION COMPETENCES AMONG THE AUTHORITIES IN EU COUNTRIES. ADVANTAGES 
AND DISADVANTAGES
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DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTION COMPETENCES AMONG THE AUTHORITIES IN EU COUNTRIES. ADVANTAGES 
AND DISADVANTAGES (cont´d)
BOX 4.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a         National resolution authority part of the prudential supervisory authority.
         National resolution authority independent from prudential supervisor.
b MREL: minimum requirement of own funds and elegible liabilities
c? ?????????????? ???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that this authority shall be integrated into BaFin following the "agency within an agency" model.
d? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????? ???????????????????
           
A  ALLOCATION OF RESOLUTION COMPETENCES ARISING FROM THE BRRD IN THE SSM MEMBER COUNTRIES (a)
Resolvability and
resolution plans
Determination
of MREL (b)
Activation of
resolution trigger
Implementation of resolution 
instruments
Belgium
Nationale Ban? van België/
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique
Nationale Ban? van België/
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique
Nationale Ban? van België/
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique
Nationale Ban? van België/
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique
Nationale Ban? van België/
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique – Resolution Fund
Cyprus Central Ban? of Cyprus Central Ban? of Cyprus Central Ban? of Cyprus Central Ban? of Cyprus Central Ban? of Cyprus
Finland
Financial Crisis
Resolution Bureau
Financial Crisis
Resolution Bureau
Financial Crisis
Resolution Bureau
Financial Crisis
Resolution Bureau
Financial Crisis Resolution 
Bureau- Deposit Guarantee 
and Resolution Fund
France
Prudential Control and 
Resolution Authority
Prudential Control and 
Resolution Authority
Prudential Control and 
Resolution Authority
Prudential Control and 
Resolution Authority
Prudential Control and 
Resolution Authority 
- Deposit Guarantee and 
Resolution Fund
Germany (c) BaFin BaFin BaFin BaFin BaFin
Greece Ban? of Greece Ban? of Greece Ban? of Greece Ban? of Greece
Ban? of Greece - Gree??
Deposit Guarantee and 
Investment Fund
Ireland Central Ban? of Ireland Central Ban? of Ireland Central Ban? of Ireland Central Ban? of Ireland Central Ban? of Ireland
Italy (d) Banca d’Italia Banca d’Italia Banca d’Italia Banca d’Italia Pending
Latvia
Financial and Capital
Mar?et Commission
Financial and Capital
Mar?et Commission
Financial and Capital
Mar?et Commission
Financial and Capital
Mar?et Commission
Pending
Malta
Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
Malta Financial Services 
Authority
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Ban? De Nederlandsche Ban? De Nederlandsche Ban? De Nederlandsche Ban? Pending
Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal
Banco de Portugal
- Resolution Fund
Slovenia Ban?a Slovenije Ban?a Slovenije Ban?a Slovenije Ban?a Slovenije Ban?a Slovenije
Member State
Preventive phase Resolution phase
Management of
Resolution Fund
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The ESRB, in compliance with the requirements of the European solvency regulations, 
issued a Recommendation in June this year offering guidance on the setting of CCB rates in 
the EU (ESRB/2014/13). This Recommendation implements and adapts the Basel principles 
to the European Union and establishes two additional principles: one on communication, 
and the other on mutual recognition by countries of the buffer rate. Set out below are 
elements for measuring and calculating the credit-to-GDP gap and calculating the CCB rate 
to be applied. The Recommendation also offers guidance on which other quantitative 
indicators can help signal both the activation and deactivation of the CCB.
As regards compliance periods, the designated national authorities and the ECB are 
expected, by June 2016 at the latest, to send a report to the ESRB, the European Council and 
the European Commission explaining the measures taken to comply with the recommendation. 
If the authorities decide to activate the CCB beforehand, the recommendations will be 
applicable as from the time the CCB is activated. Finally, the national authorities shall send 
reports every three years explaining the implementation of the measures contained in the 
recommendation. 
Most of the macroprudential instruments considered so far address risks in the banking 
sector. However, so-called shadow banking operations are also of relevance to the goal of 
preventing and mitigating financial stability-related risks.
The FSB broadly defines the shadow banking sector as credit intermediation involving 
activities or institutions outside the regular banking sector. Under this definition, the 
shadow banking segment requiring most attention owing to its potential effects on financial 
stability is that whose credit intermediation activities may generate systemic risks and or 
regulatory arbitrage. As to systemic risks, particular attention should be paid to those 
activities involving liquidity and maturity transformation, leverage and imperfect credit risk 
transfer. A simplified way of conceptually bounding the scope of shadow banking is to 
confine it to financial activities with bank-like characteristics (entailing leverage and 
maturity transformation) performed by non-bank financial institutions. This is what the FSB 
calls a narrow definition of the shadow banking system. 
To address the risks arising from the shadow banking system, the FSB is working along 
two lines. First, to set in place a monitoring framework that enables the national authorities 
to analyse developments in shadow banking with the aim of identifying the build-up of 
systemic risks in this area, and ultimately, to take corrective measures. Second, to 
strengthen oversight and regulation of different areas of the shadow banking system.4 
Here, and at the European level, there are currently two proposed European Commission 
Regulations. First, that on Money Market Funds, of September 2013; and second, that on 
securities financing transactions, in January this year.
In order to monitor the shadow banking system, the FSB’s work takes the form of three 
steps. The first involves analysing the financial system as a whole in an attempt to 
approximate the weight of the shadow banking system. In this step the broad definition of 
the shadow banking system is adopted, whereby it is defined as the set of the so-called 
“other financial institutions”5(OFIs), and the information is obtained from each country’s 
The ESRB, in compliance with 
the requirements of the 
European solvency 
regulations, issued a 
Recommendation in June this 
year on guidance for setting 
CCB rates
4.2 Shadow banking
The FSB has set in train 
initiatives for the monitoring of 
the shadow banking system 
and has proposed measures 
for different areas
3  European Systemic Risk Board (2014) “Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 18 June 2014 
on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates”, ESRB/2014/1.
4  See, for example, FSB (2013) “Strengthening oversight and regulation of shadow banking – An overview of policy 
recommendations”, August.
5  OFIs are financial institutions that are not banks, insurance companies or pension funds.
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Over the last few months the work has been completed for the 
creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
The main aim of the SSM is to enhance the quality of banking 
sector supervision in the participating countries1 and promote 
greater financial integration, so as to prevent the markets from 
assigning different valuations to similar financial assets on the 
basis of the nationality of the issuer. This is essential to break the 
negative link between doubts about the solvency of credit institutions 
and sovereign risk which, in the most acute stages of the recent 
crisis, triggered doubts over the very continuity of monetary 
union.
The new supervisory mechanism will become fully operational on 4 
November 2014. In order to make this possible, following the 
approval of the SSM Regulation in October 2013 and in tandem with 
a Comprehensive Assessment exercise covering the significant 
euro area banks (see Chapter 3 of this Report), much work has been 
done to define the legal framework, organisation and supervisory 
model of the SSM. A Framework Regulation has been approved, 
establishing the main outlines of the supervisory function and its 
organisation, and clarifying the division of responsibilities between 
the ECB and the national authorities. A Supervisory Manual has also 
been prepared, establishing the procedures to be followed in the 
performance of supervisory tasks, which will help to harmonise the 
procedures within the SSM2. 
The SSM is an integrated system of oversight of credit institutions, 
combining the leadership of the ECB with the active participation 
of the national authorities, including the Banco de España. In this 
respect, both the ECB and the national authorities will be bound to 
cooperate in good faith and to exchange information in the 
exercise of their respective powers.
When defining the governance arrangements of the SSM, 
particular note was taken of the need to ensure that the new 
supervisory tasks assumed by the ECB do not clash with its 
powers in the area of monetary policy. To that end, in accordance 
with the SSM Regulation, a Supervisory Board has been 
established within the ECB to plan and carry out supervisory 
tasks. The Supervisory Board is composed of a chair and vice-
chair, a representative of each national authority and four 
representatives of the ECB. They will propose draft decisions to 
the Governing Council of the ECB, which is the final decision-
making body. Nevertheless, supervisory decisions will be adopted 
by the “non-objection” procedure, whereby the Governing Council 
may not amend the proposals, but it may return them to the 
Supervisory Board for reconsideration. The Regulation provides 
for the creation of a Mediation Panel, entrusted with settling any 
potential disagreements between the two bodies.
An Administrative Board of Review has also been established, with 
the power to conduct an internal administrative review of the 
decisions made by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory 
powers. Any natural person or supervised entity may ask for a 
decision to be reviewed, provided that the decision directly affects 
that person or entity. The Board of Review has five independent 
members.
The list of banks to be directly supervised by the ECB was finalised 
in September. In view of the large number of credit institutions 
established in the euro area, the SSM Regulation distinguishes 
between “significant” banks, which are to be directly supervised 
by the ECB, and “less significant” banks which will continue to be 
the responsibility of the national authorities, even though the ECB 
will supervise them indirectly.
The criteria used to determine the significance of a bank are as 
follows:
— It has total consolidated assets over €30 billion.
—  The ratio of assets to the GDP of the country where it is 
established exceeds 20%, unless its total consolidated assets 
are below €5 billion.
— It is one of the three largest banks in a Member State.
—  It has subsidiaries, in more than one of the participating 
countries, whose cross-border assets or liabilities account for 
more than 20% of its total assets or liabilities.
—  It has received or requested direct financial assistance from 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
On this basis, a list of 120 significant banks has been drawn up, 
representing approximately 85% of euro area bank assets. Fifteen 
of these are Spanish (a number that will drop to 14 when a 
concentration process currently under way concludes). A list of 
some 3,700 less significant institutions throughout the euro area 
has also been drawn up. In the case of Spain, the significant banks 
that will be supervised directly by the ECB account for more than 
90% of the assets of the country’s deposit-taking institutions.
In order to be able to perform its new tasks, the ECB has 
established a new organisational structure specifically for 
supervision, creating four new directorates general; two will be 
responsible for day-to-day supervision of the significant banks; a 
third for indirect supervision of the less significant banks, aiming to 
ensure that supervisory practices are harmonised and meet 
maximum quality standards; and a fourth for specialised and 
horizontal tasks relating to all the banks supervised by the SSM. 
Moreover, the ECB personnel selection processes for exercise of 
the new supervisory powers are at a very advanced stage and a 
good number of Banco de España staff have been selected here, 
ENTRY INTO OPERATION OF THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM BOX 4.2
1  All the euro area countries take part in the SSM, but any EU country that 
decides to enter into a close cooperation agreement with the ECB may 
also join, in accordance with the terms laid down in the Regulation.
2  See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/otherssmguidebankingsupervision
201409en.pdf?85e39f5cf761e11147f6e828cd4088b13.
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Financial Accounts, supplementing them with other relevant sources (information from 
supervisors). The second step consists of identifying those aspects of the shadow 
banking system that generate systemic risks, or that may give rise to regulatory arbitrage 
situations. In this case, the focus will be on those credit intermediation activities that 
involve liquidity and maturity transformation, leverage and imperfect credit risk transfer 
and which, in turn, through banking consolidation, are not already covered by banking 
regulation and supervision. Finally, in the third step, it is sought to deepen the assessment 
and analysis of the systemic risks and possibilities of regulatory arbitrage identified, 
having regard to the interconnections between the shadow banking system and the 
traditional banking system.
As part of its monitoring work, the FSB has since 2011 been conducting a global monitoring 
exercise aimed at assessing trends and risks in the shadow banking system.6 Following 
the line of this monitoring exercise, the relative weight of shadow banking in Spain can be 
seen to be comparatively low. The most significant institutions among OFIs were investment 
funds until 2006, at which time they were displaced by securitisation special-purpose 
entities, although in 2013 investment funds did begin to regain part of their share, as is 
highlighted in Chapter 2 (see Chart 4.1.A).
The weight of shadow banking 
in Spain is comparatively low
BOX 4.2ENTRY INTO OPERATION OF THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (cont´d)
de España shall also provide support for on-site inspections, 
compile and convey any information required, take part in the 
preparation of supervisory decisions and collaborate in penalty 
procedures.
One key difference from the existing supervisory model in Spain is 
that the new SSM model draws a clear distinction between monitoring 
and inspection activities, which will be performed by different teams. 
In this respect, it is envisaged that the on-site inspection teams will be 
essentially national teams, although the ECB will ensure that all 
countries follow the same quality criteria and methods. For the 
purposes of this work, as part of the recent reorganisation at the 
Banco de España, several specialised inspection teams have been 
created.
Lastly, the national authorities will be responsible for directly 
supervising the less significant banks (except for matters relating 
to common procedures: processes for authorisation and 
withdrawal of authorisation, and decisions relating to qualifying 
holdings). In any event, in the exercise of these powers the national 
authorities shall keep the ECB informed at all times. The ECB will 
monitor the quality of the supervision work and, as the ultimate 
party responsible for the smooth functioning of the SSM, may 
issue regulations, guidelines or general instructions designed to 
ensure that supervisory practices are consistent. Moreover, where 
necessary and after consulting with the relevant national authority, 
the ECB may decide to take on the direct supervision of a less 
significant bank if it is necessary in order to ensure that supervisory 
rules are uniformly applied. 
both among senior management (one of the four directors general 
and two of the seven deputy directors general are from the Banco 
de España) and middle management and supervisory staff in 
general.
The entry into operation of the SSM will entail a far-reaching 
change in the supervisory responsibilities of the national 
authorities. To smooth this process, the Banco de España has 
recently approved a reorganisation of its Directorate General 
Banking Supervision, with a view to ensuring that it can participate 
in the new mechanism as efficiently as possible. For that purpose 
the four existing departments have been reorganised so as to 
mirror, insofar as possible, the structure and tasks of the ECB’s 
four directorates general.
In addition, a Joint Supervisory Team (JST) has been created for 
each significant bank. These teams are made up of staff from both 
the ECB and the national authorities, and will each be headed by 
an ECB coordinator who will be assisted, in turn, by one or more 
deputy coordinators from the national authorities. The teams will 
be responsible, inter alia, for the ongoing assessment of the risk 
profile, capital adequacy and liquidity of the banks. They will also 
be tasked with preparing draft decisions to be submitted to the 
Supervisory Board.
As regards the significant banks, the Banco de España, as a 
competent national authority, shall assist the ECB, providing its 
experience and the majority of supervisors on the JSTs (in a 
proportion of approximately 4 to 1). Among other tasks, the Banco 
6  See FSB (2013) “Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013”, November.
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In Spain, more than 40% of OFIs’ assets in 2013 related to institutions consolidating into 
banking groups, mainly owing to securitisation special-purpose entities. If entities not 
engaging in credit intermediation — such as equity funds and listed real estate investment 
companies (SOCIMIS by their Spanish acronym) — are added here, it is seen that the 
assets of shadow banks account for 46% of GDP, this ratio being one of the lowest among 
the developed countries (see footnote 6). Of these assets, almost half are assets of other 
investment funds, i.e. those other than equity funds.
Chart 4.1.B shows the weight of bank assets and liabilities vis-à-vis shadow banking 
system entities in Spain following the FSB’s “narrow” definition. These bank assets vis-à-
vis shadow banking entities institutions were until 2011 always below 2% of the banking 
balance sheet and, in 2013, stood at 3.7%. The growth observed in 2013 can chiefly be 
explained by the decline in banking assets. Likewise, Spanish banks’ dependence on 
these entities for their funding is low, since bank liabilities, too, vis-à-vis shadow banks 
accounted for only 3.7% of their balance sheet in 2013. As with assets, the growth seen in 
2013 is attributable in the main to the decline in banking assets. 
Since 2002, the two main issuers of accounting standards worldwide — the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) — have been working together to reduce the differences between their respective 
accounting models. The crisis revealed significant weaknesses in the accounting treatment 
of financial instruments (technical complexity and scant and slow recognition of impairment) 
and in consequence, in April 2009, the G-20 asked both bodies to review and align their 
respective standards. As a result the work was expedited, with a view to reducing the 
complexity and issuing a new common standard.
On 24 July 2014 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 was published, 
replacing International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, and which is the IASB’s response to 
the G-20’s concerns. IFRS 9, which will apply from 1 January 2018, contains new features 
that are of particular significance with regard to how credit losses are estimated and 
recognised and how financial assets are classified and measured, and to hedge accounting.
4.3 Publication of IFRS 9
IFRS 9 is the IASB’s response 
to the G-20’s request to 
overcome the weaknesses of 
the accounting framework that 
the crisis revealed
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a OFIs which consolidate with banking institutions and/or which do not intermediate in credit are excluded.
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Under IAS 39, recognition of impairment of financial assets not recorded on the balance 
sheet at fair value was subject to the existence of an observable loss event; this is what is 
known as an incurred loss model. The financial crisis revealed the weaknesses of this 
model, as credit loss recognition was too little, too late.
In response to this problem IRFS 9 introduces a new approach, that is, the expected loss 
model, based on the following recognition methodology:
—  When the transaction is initially reported, credit losses associated with the 
default events estimated over a 12-month horizon are recognised.
—  Subsequently, lifetime expected credit losses (i.e. those arising from the 
default events estimated beyond the 12-month horizon) will be recognised 
when there is a significant increase in the credit risk associated with the 
exposure in comparison with the credit risk assigned when it was first 
reported on the balance sheet.
IFRS 9 does not establish a specific methodology to determine when this 
significant increase in credit risk arises although, to simplify the analysis, it 
does establish a rebuttable presumption of more than 30 days past due. It also 
admits collective analysis for groups of assets with uniform credit risk.
IFRS 9 leaves the default criterion to be used in banks’ hands, without offering a specific 
methodology for estimating expected losses. It simply recommends that historical loss 
rates be used as a starting point, adjusted for current and forecast credit conditions on the 
estimation date, in each disclosure of financial statements.
IFRS 9 also makes changes to how financial assets are classified and measured. In this 
case, measurement bases such as amortised cost and fair value are still used, but financial 
assets are reclassified between measurement categories.
Under IAS 39, whether an instrument was classified in one portfolio or another depended 
on management’s intentions. For example, a financial asset held to produce gains in the 
short term was classified in the trading book, while the same instrument acquired with the 
intention of holding it to maturity was classified in the held-to-maturity portfolio. In the first 
case, the asset was recorded on the balance sheet at fair value, while in the second it was 
recorded at amortised cost.
IFRS 9 replaces this form of classifying financial assets by portfolios with two different 
criteria: the cash flow characteristics of the asset and the business model of the entity.7 
The overall result of this change is that financial assets that resemble debt instruments will 
only be measured at amortised cost if the business model implies that they are held 
essentially to collect the contractual cash flows. Without entering into the more technical 
details of the standard, financial assets resembling debt that are not held only to collect 
the contractual cash flows are recorded at fair value, with any changes in their value being 
directly recorded through equity, while all other financial instruments will also be recorded 
at fair value, but with any changes in their value being recorded through the income 
statement.
Most importantly for the 
banking sector, IFRS 9 
changes how credit losses are 
estimated and recognised
IFRS 9 also changes the 
criteria for classifying and 
measuring financial assets,... 
7  The business model is understood as the way in which the entity manages assets in order to generate cash flows.
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Lastly, the third change made by IFRS 9 relates to hedge accounting, where a new general 
framework is established which eases the requirements for applying hedge accounting 
and the measurement of hedge effectiveness, but which will essentially affect companies 
that use hedges with non-financial underlyings.
For its part, even though the US regulator (FASB) has not yet published its standard, and 
is not expected to do so until well into 2015, that standard will be different from IFRS 9 and 
will, to the best of our knowledge, entail, among other differences, initial recognition of 
total expected losses, which will mean earlier recognition and reporting of impairment of 
financial assets than under IFRS 9 and will signify, despite the insistence of the G-20, 
failure to achieve the desired convergence between the IASB and FASB standards.
... and for hedge accounting
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